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Wednesday, Feb 08, 2006

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Geneva talks: not much scope for optimism

V.S. Sambandan

The limited range of talks between the LTTE and Colombo does not provide much scope for optimism that a success at Geneva will translate into a ready-made recipe for peace.

SEVERAL ISSUES will be at stake when the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) meet in Geneva later this month. There is no reasonable ground for optimism that the talks will mark a resumption of full-fledged negotiations on conflict resolution. For, the exercise is restricted to issues of implementation of the February 2002 ceasefire agreement.

On February 7, the LTTE made its agenda explicit, stating it "is not prepared to discuss modifications to the ceasefire agreement or to push the ceasefire agreement aside and waste time talking about [a] political solution."

As the LTTE has made it evident, the talks are not about a political solution to the separatist conflict. They are not even about resuming from where the last round of engagement broke off — implementation of the agreements reached in six rounds of negotiations between September 2002 and March 2003.

Even on the ceasefire agreement, the Geneva talks are not intended to cover the militarised conflict in its entirety. Clearly, the purpose is to stave off war and keep afloat the fragile ceasefire agreement as it enters its fourth year when the two sides meet on February 22 and 23.

This leaves them with a razor-thin agenda but one which may still have immense prospects for peace or otherwise in Sri Lanka. Simply put, the talks mark the short-term desire for continuation of a "negative peace" — a scenario of non-fighting — rather than a long-term pointer to a big push towards positive elements of conflict resolution.

Even within this limited ambit, the Government and the LTTE have several issues to bring to the table. The cumulative figures compiled by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) make it clear that the LTTE's violations of the ceasefire agreement far outnumber those by the Government. A total of 3,471 cases (including 18 assassinations) were ruled violations by the LTTE, compared to 162 violations by the Government.

The primary issue for the Tigers is the continued presence of supporters of its former eastern special commander, V. Muralitharan, (`Col.' Karuna) in the eastern Batticaloa district. By all indications, their main talking point will be implementation of clause 1.8 of the February 2002 ceasefire agreement, on the issue of "Tamil paramilitaries."

The clause reads: "1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the northern and eastern provinces."

Herein lies a fundamental difference in the Government and LTTE perspectives. For the LTTE, the emergence of Karuna and his supporters in Batticaloa has questioned its claim to being the "sole representative" of the island's Tamils. Hence its call that the Government should "disarm Tamil paramilitaries," invoking a clause in the agreement.

Significantly, the Karuna factor has also eclipsed the long-standing LTTE demand that the northern High Security Zones be reduced. Though the ceasefire agreement touches on the northern issue, the LTTE has not yet pitch-forked it into the current public debate. This downplaying, however, does not mean the issue has been forgotten. At the most, it has been deferred.

From the Government's perspective, the issue of Tamil paramilitaries is non-existent in the current context. The LTTE's rebellion, it is contended, was a post-ceasefire development. Colombo also says the paramilitaries who were in operation when the ceasefire agreement was signed have been disarmed. In another dimension to the southern perspective, there is a view that the LTTE, which initially described the rebellion by `Col.' Karuna as an "internal matter," is now bringing it into the public domain as it is unable to contain it.

For the Government, one main issue is the continued killing by the LTTE. One key change in the ground situation since the ceasefire agreement is that the Army's Long Rangers — a deep penetration unit deployed to take on LTTE targets inside rebel-held areas before 2002 — have been eliminated. Since 2002 intelligence officials and operatives have been killed, including those in the higher echelons of the state apparatus. Then came the assassination of Foreign Affairs Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. In several ways, the assassination by a suspected LTTE sniper catalysed the international opinion.

Following the election of Mahinda Rajapakse as President, the sudden spurt in killings in the north and east Sri Lanka had its own dynamic. If provocation was the Tigers' motive, it failed. Not even the suicide attack on a naval fast attack craft pushed the fragile truce over the edge. The Geneva talks could hence be construed as a holding operation.

It is within this that the Government and the LTTE appear set to make their moves to ward off the threat of war. The talks also provide the setting for a round of propaganda manoeuvres, particularly by the LTTE.

The talks are taking place when the European Union is actively considering the formal listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. On the heels of the assassination of Kadirgamar, the E.U. said LTTE delegations would not be welcome in its capitals. This, to a large extent, explained the LTTE's insistence that the talks commence in Oslo. Now that Geneva has emerged as the agreed venue, indications are the Tigers will utilise the meeting to engage both the Tamil diaspora and the international audience during their visit to Switzerland.

Expanded delegation

Symbolically, the LTTE has presented an expanded delegation to Geneva, consisting of the head of its `Police force,' its new eastern leadership and, more critically, its northern military commander. The sub-text of the composition of the LTTE's negotiating team is that it represents a statement of a "de facto state" being run by the Tigers.

The Government delegation is to be led by Health Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva. Its team does not have experienced political negotiators. To overcome this limitation, the Government has embarked upon serious background preparation for the negotiators. However, at the negotiating table, what would matter are the personal chemistry of the negotiators and their ability to make their points with telling effect.

For instance, while the LTTE has said Clause 1.8 would be its main talking point, there is little mention by the Government of the serious skew in the violations of the ceasefire agreement.

The unfolding political developments — both within Sri Lanka and abroad, particularly in India — are critical factors that run alongside the Geneva talks. The island-wide local bodies elections to be held in a couple of months will emerge as a reality check for the main political parties.

A key difficulty for Mr. Rajapakse is his international image trap. Elected to office with the backing of the unitarist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the majoritarian-hardline Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), his intentions are under a cloud in the international community, which strongly advocates power sharing. Against that backdrop, the manner in which the ruling party strikes its equations with the JVP and the JHU for the local bodies elections will be a pointer to the future.

The LTTE will also watch the coming Tamil Nadu Assembly elections to further its external propaganda and leverage. These emerging domestic and international democratic exercises give the LTTE the required breathing space to attempt, yet again, an image makeover.

The narrow focus of the Geneva talks will confine the negotiations to the points the LTTE is keen on securing. It could run the risk of glossing over other critical aspects of the ceasefire agreement.

The limited range of the talks does not provide much scope for optimism that a success at Geneva will translate into a ready-made recipe for peace. A failure, however, would push Sri Lanka back to its increasingly familiar situation of being a nation that is frequently on the brink.

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