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Thursday, Aug 05, 2004

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Opinion - Leader Page Articles

The Afghan endgame

By M.K. Bhadrakumar

Clearly, the U.S. has accommodated Pakistan's concerns. Will Islamabad now "deliver" on Afghanistan's stabilisation?

THE SURPRISE decision by Afghan President Hamid Karzai to drop Defence Minister Mohammed Fahim as his running mate in the October 9 presidential election signifies a defining moment in the peace process. Its downstream impact will be profound both for the stabilisation of the Afghan situation and for regional security.

Mr. Karzai's decision may lend itself to the naked eye as the sidelining of yet another Afghan "warlord." Without doubt, Mr. Fahim is the most powerful military commander in Afghanistan today. He commands the Tajik forces of the Shura-e-Nazar previously led by Ahmad Shah Masood. Other warlords of the erstwhile Northern Alliance (N.A.), which led the anti-Taliban resistance during 1996-2001, too have been systematically sidelined in recent weeks. They include Afghan Uzbeki leader Rashid Dostum, Hazara Shiite militia commander Mohammed Mohaqiq, and Tajik leaders Ismail Khan, Yunus Qanooni and Mohammed Atta. They are arrayed against Mr. Karzai, setting side their mutual antipathies.

Thus the N.A., which had powerful regional support at one time — from Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran, India — now finds itself in political opposition to Mr. Karzai. The United States too had use for N.A. forces as foot soldiers for its intervention in 2001 and until recently leaned on them to assist in the operations against Taliban. N.A. leaders feel particularly let down that as recently as June they had been given an impression that they would remain as the backbone of any future government.

Mr. Karzai has opted for two non-Pashtun figures as his running mates — Hazara chief Akbar Khalili and Masood's brother, Ahmad Zia Masood. This is a shrewd move aimed at dividing the N.A. camp. Though their electoral appeal in the northern and western provinces remains debatable, Mr. Karzai sees an advantage in projecting a pan-Afghan candidacy. Also, Mr. Khalili spent many years in Iran and Mr. Masood lived much of his adult life in Western capitals and lately in Russia. Thus, notionally they were associated with the Afghan jihad, yet they are anything but jihadis in outlook or in political temperament. They have no independent power base, unlike Mr. Fahim, to challenge Kabul's supremacy.

The N.A. would have only itself to blame for being marginalised. N.A. groups fell apart once the Taliban was ousted. Regional powers that previously backed them and constantly helped keep these disparate groups together lacked the motivation to persist. Regional powers, revelling in the "gains" of the Taliban's ouster in October 2001 (and Pakistan's "defeat"), lacked the vision to guide the N.A. to transform itself into a progressive force.

But that is only part of the story. More importantly, the Americans have calculated that the N.A.'s downsizing would indirectly enhance the appeal of Mr. Karzai's presidential ticket in the eyes of the majority Pashtuns. The expectation is that Pashtun tribes would feel elated that with the N.A.'s downsizing they would regain their ascendancy in Kabul's power politics.

The shadows that fall on the Pashtun constituency, however, are several. They include shades of the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as well. American and British intelligence have worked closely with Pakistan in recent months to finesse the Taliban movement and Mr. Hekmatyar's followers among the Ghilzai. Several senior Taliban leaders have been "encouraged" to cross over to Mr. Karzai.

Appreciating the U.S. policy of co-opting the "good" Taliban, the leader of Pakistan's Jamiat Ulema I- Ulema-I-Islam, Maulana Fazlur Rahman (who has traditionally close links with the Taliban) noted recently with satisfaction: "The situation is not like previously when Western powers were not prepared to listen to the name `Taliban'. Now they are certainly prepared for many compromises... There is a visible change in their behaviour. Mr. Jack Straw came to Pakistan this year and I spoke to him about the same thing, saying `Please do not abandon the Taliban as they are the real binding force in Afghanistan', and Mr. Straw agreed with me that the dialogue process should not exclude any Afghan party."

Equally so, a solid Pashtun vote bank for Mr. Karzai is sought to be finessed with Pakistan's helping hand. The U.S. has acted as midwife to forge an agreement whereby Afghan nationals living in Pakistan for 20 years and more can vote in the October 9 election.

It is the crowning irony of the Afghan war that Pakistan finds itself exclusively sharing the "driving seat" with the U.S. in fashioning the contours of the future power structure of Afghanistan. Hardly three years have passed since the ouster of the Taliban whose rise had been stage-managed under direct Pakistani supervision.

Pakistan's demands in the post-Taliban Afghan situation have been that first, the N.A.'s key role in the Kabul power structure will be unacceptable. Secondly, Mr. Fahim must be removed from power. In Pakistan's view, the N.A. and Mr. Fahim pose a threat as they act under Iranian and Indian influence. Again, Pakistan wanted the postponement of elections in Afghanistan beyond June (as stipulated by the Bonn Agreement) until such a time as "participation" by Pashtuns was assured; Pashtuns must be given their due role in Afghanistan's governance. Finally, the Taliban should not be bracketed with Osama bin Laden or Al-Qaeda. Clearly, the U.S. has accommodated Pakistan on all these elements. Mr. Fahim's fall is the latest link in the chain.

Peace-loving Afghans and regional powers should keep their fingers crossed and hope that Pakistan will now "deliver" on Afghanistan's stabilisation. Will the U.S. be successful in nudging Pakistan to show "more muscle" in reining in the Afghan militants? The prognosis is mixed, though. Pakistani commentators, apprehensive about their country's long term stability, have been warning that an entire "infrastructure" that can take Afghanistan back into the abyss of violence at short notice still exists intact within Pakistan in the sub-soil, which puts Islamabad in a spoiler's role unless it gets precisely what its Afghan policy, originally chiselled by General Zia-ul Haq, has consistently sought. Indeed a middle-level Afghan intelligence official in Kandahar reportedly reached Mullah Omar recently by simply calling him on his satellite telephone located somewhere near Quetta.

(The writer is a former Indian Foreign Service officer who has served extensively in Central Asia.)

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