Security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal

By K. Santhanam & Rajesh Rajagopalan

AS THE war in Afghanistan enters the fifth week, concerns have emerged about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. A spate of reports, sourced out of Washington, has suggested the possibility of a diversion of Pakistani nuclear arms and material to Osama bin Laden or other terrorists. That the concern has surfaced despite announcements about the Pakistan Nuclear Command Authority for ensuring prevention of unauthorised use and accidents is indicative of a sub-surface alarm that the Government in power may be unable to exercise the desired command and control. This loss of control has been projected as likely to occur due to fundamentalist elements in Pakistan seizing the arsenal either by themselves or in collusion with sections of the Pakistan Army who disagree with General Pervez Musharraf's support to the U.S. The probability, however remote, of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the Al-Qaeda appears to be a nightmare to the U.S. and the entire liberal democratic world as well. If Pakistan's nuclear weapons are highly miniaturised (doubtful) and Osama gets them, he would well be exercising the ``Samsonite Option'' - the suitcase bomb - in the U.S.

To stave off such a threat, the U.S. is likely to seek some means of assuring itself that Pakistan's nukes do not end up in the wrong hands, as part of its counter-proliferation strategy.

The U.S. has recently run up experience in dealing with nuclear weapons in countries undergoing severe economic crises or facing the collapse of state institutions due to political upheavals. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan rejoined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. About 600 kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) was moved out from Kazakhstan to the U.S. in a package deal involving massive economic aid under Operation Sapphire (1994). Also, more than 5000 nuclear warheads (including about 3000-3500 with strategic yields) on their soil were dis- assembled and taken away to Russia during 1993-96, with U.S. financial assistance.

On the eve of black majority rule in South Africa, in 1991, the U.S. and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mounted a special operation under which the ``nuclear cores'' produced by the South African Atomic Energy Commission were ``accounted'' and removed to safe custody. Though the final storage place of this material is not clear, it could be the U.S. Reports indicate that some 30 kg of weapons-grade plutonium and 55 kg of 80 per cent HEU were removed from South African control.

Third, reports indicate that a number of nuclear weapons cores of the erstwhile USSR were sent to the U.S. for dis-assembly and safe custody. The HEU recovered from these cores was subsequently ``denatured'' and converted to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use in nuclear power reactors.

Fourth, reeling under severe economic and political crises, Argentina (1983) and Brazil (1990) abandoned their nuclear weapons programme under U.S. persuasion. It is not known whether Argentina actually possessed nuclear cores. But Brazil had built an underground shaft in preparation for nuclear testing before the programme was abandoned.

It is known that, from the early 1970s, the U.S. administration made a number of moves to dissuade Pakistan from embarking on a nuclear weapons programme (e.g. abandoning the fuel re-processing plant for plutonium recovery from France and getting A-5 aircraft and other systems to increase Pakistan's conventional inventories). A number of specific amendments were also passed by the Senate to apply sanctions on Pakistan over the years. However, U.S. non-proliferation concerns were relegated to the backseat after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the U.S. administration resumed massive arming of Pakistan as a ``frontline state''. The rest is history, including the growth of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and its output in the U.S.

Given the above examples of U.S. custody of nuclear cores of five countries and the backlash of the September 11 attacks, what could be the options open to the U.S. in obtaining reliable assurances that Pakistan's nuclear weapons would not fall into undesirable hands?

The first option would appear to be the most desirable from the U.S. perspective and the least acceptable to Pakistan: move the nuclear cores to U.S. safe custody. Open acceptance of this option by Gen. Musharraf would certainly inflame the armed forces and the people who would perceive it as the ``ultimate surrender'' to the U.S. as well as blunting of the ``nuclear sword of Islam''. As a variant, the nuclear cores could, of course, be whisked away through a mutually-agreed covert operation. Then, the passions may be less intense. But, given the open nature of the current debate and the porous (or selectively porous) nature of information-handling in the U.S. system, doubts would rise in the minds of the people of Pakistan about a quiet sell-out. Of course, massive U.S. aid for the economic development of Pakistan would be used as the heavy sweetener.

The second option which may be considered by the U.S., and may be less controversial from the Pakistani perspective, could be a mutually agreed techno-strategic arrangement under which the disposition and movement of nuclear cores and trigger sub- assemblies are monitored in a cooperative way. The system could be a non-intrusive, miniature Data Collection and Transmission System (with a clock, a GPS receiver and telemetry) which is attached to core/trigger containers. It could provide their locational information to both countries either in a periodic or a continuous manner, via secure radio links. Such systems are known to be used by many nuclear weapon countries. They form part of the safety and security measures at storage sites and are used during transportation. These systems could provide early warning of any ``illegal'' or ``unauthorised'' movements.

Perhaps to ensure the survivability of its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan may choose to inflate the size of its arsenal, increase the number of locations involved and expand the list of shipment routes associated with functions such as maintenance of the arsenal. These may not be unacceptable to the U.S. For the type of assurance that the U.S. needs, an increase by Pakistan of the number of cores or locations or routes is not at all important; their authorised disposition is.

Pakistan, from its perspective, may like to be technically sure that such systems attached to nuclear cores and triggers would not render them ineffective or unusable when needed under conditions of a national exigency. There could be easy technical convergence on this matter. What is more important to both countries is a reliable quantitative way of knowing that no unauthorised moves have occurred. If they do, it may indicate the acquisition by a terrorist outfit of a nuclear weapon. This, clearly, is a matter which ought to be of concern as much to Pakistan as to the U.S. And indeed, the rest of the world.

Pakistan would also have other concerns. It could insist that the U.S. give up any effort to ``cap and rollback'' its nuclear weapons programme, that the U.S. provide guarantees for the security of its nuclear establishments and that the U.S. keep Israel and India out of such an arrangement. These are part of their bilateral process and the U.S. would need to take them on board.

It is to be expected that Pakistan may tell the U.S. that a similar monitoring arrangement should be emplaced in India also. This would be the customary, diversionary tactic and need not be taken seriously. It is also unnecessary in India because of its nuclear doctrine, posture, firm political control and absence of fundamentalist links with the nuclear and defence establishments.

As the war in Afghanistan further unfolds and the threat of nuclear terrorism looms large, it may not be surprising if the U.S. and Pakistan converge on the second option.

(The writers are, respectively, Director and Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.)

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