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Sharecroppers, stoneless rice and the Nobel
By Achin Chakraborty
THREE AMERICAN economists, George Akerlof, Michael Spence and
Joseph Stiglitz, have won the Nobel Prize in economics for their
contributions to information economics. The reader, who has not
had the misfortune of learning economics at any point in life,
would normally find no compelling reason to be curious about it.
To the outsider, information economics, or any other branch of
theoretical economics for that matter, may appear to be an
esoteric, even absurd, affair. But if one is curious about things
in general, and has an analytical bend of mind as well, there is
much in information economics which would surely stir up one's
interest. To sensationalise a bit, it is the Indian sharecropper,
the outcaste and the Indian housewife busy sorting stones from
rice who triggered this branch of knowledge in economics. To many
economists, this is one of the most exciting things to have
happened in economics in the recent past.
Throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s, the main body of
economics was largely concerned with discussing the conditions
under which competitive market structures result or fail to
result in an efficient allocation of resources. In this phase,
mainstream economics traded breadth for rigour. In the idealised
frictionless world of impersonal markets, where buyers knew fully
well what they were buying, and sellers had no reason to do
mischief with prices, things could be put in elegant mathematical
language. While many brilliant minds busied themselves with this
esoteric task of finding abstract answers to abstract
intellectual questions through a rigorous mathematical route,
more down-to-earth thinkers, concerned with economies of the
third world, carried on their difficult struggle to seek an
alternative route. They, for good reason, refused to give too
much weight to mainstream economists' intellectual playthings,
and got marginalised in the process.
All this had a significant impact on the way economics used to be
taught in India. For much too long, students of economics in many
Indian Universities had been fed with the well-worn piece of
wisdom from their respected teachers: ``mainstream economic
theories produced and sold by the West are all useless when you
try to deal with economies of this part of the world''. This
typical attitude has been nicely captured in the following
anecdote, which Professor Kaushik Basu heard from Professor V.M.
Dandekar. When Professor Dandekar was a young man attending a
seminar by a pompous senior economist, he spotted a simple
mathematical mistake on the blackboard and pointed it out. The
senior economist glared at him, and said, ``young man, we are not
talking about the efficient, smooth economy of an industrialised
nation; but about the chaos and clutter of underdevelopment.''
What we did not know at that time was that ``the chaos and
clutter of underdevelopment'' would change mainstream economics
forever. Some of the main ideas, which have had considerable
influence in recent advances in economics, were originally
conceived in the context of developing economies such as India.
George Akerlof was a young man of 27 when he spent a year in
India. In his own words, ``after being to India I understood that
economic systems don't necessarily work as they do in standard
economics, where markets always clear. The caste system somehow
provided me with an alternative model for how economic systems
might work.'' The uncertainty about the product qualities that he
observed in the Indian markets profoundly influenced him. When
the buyer is less informed than the seller about the quality of
the product, he/she would refuse to pay the price for good
quality since the product bought might turn out to be bad. Then
the seller will also have no incentive to make good quality
products available. In other words, the bad quality product will
push the good quality out of the market. This Akerlof generalised
in a rigorous way so that a variety of situations involving
`thin' markets could be explained.
Markets tend to be thin or underdeveloped if making transactions
is difficult for informational problems. Development thinkers of
yesteryears knew it well. But the theoretical implications were
never fully worked out until Akerlof came up with his paper ``The
market for `Lemons'' published in 1970. In this paper, he picked
up the example of the market for used cars (a lemon is a bad car
in U.S. parlance), perhaps to impress the editors of the U.S.
journals that he was dealing with a general problem (read
American), not with the problems of the `other' world which
should better be left to the soft disciplines such as
anthropology and sociology. But this eminently suitable strategy
did not work in Akerlof's case. Three top journals rejected the
paper before it was finally accepted by the fourth.
If a seller wants to convince his customer that his product is
good what should he do? In the case of durable goods, a possible
strategy is to offer warranty. The offer of warranty signals that
the product is good.
The amusing sign `Stoneless Rice Available Here' put up by the
Indian shopkeeper is also intended to serve a similar purpose,
but one is not sure about its power to convince the potential
customer. The same idea can be extended to explain labour market
features as well. If the employer has little prior information on
his/her employee's ability, he/she would hesitate to pay a high
salary, which in turn would discourage more productive workers to
join. The more productive job-seeker would then need to give a
signal which would help his/her employer to sort out the good
from the bad. The level of education may perform this signalling
function, because more productive workers usually have a greater
incentive to acquire education. Issues of this kind form the core
of Michael Spence's theory of market signalling.
We thus see in the real world a variety of spontaneous responses
to problems arising out of the fact that between two parties in a
transaction, one has more information than the other. Although
this informational asymmetry is universal, it is more pervasive
in the developing world. Joseph Stiglitz provided the leadership
to a whole group of development economists in their endeavour to
understand various aspects of agrarian institutions, such as
share tenancy, in terms of risk-sharing and asymmetry of
information. The landlord, just by looking at the harvest, cannot
ascertain whether the labourer worked hard or not. A bad crop
does not necessarily mean less effort was put in. So what should
the landlord do? Close monitoring is needed. But if the
landlord's time is not cheap it may be ideal for him to enter
into a share contract, where the tenant farmer partly shares the
risk of bad harvest.
Among the three laureates, Stiglitz is perhaps the most widely-
known, for his tirade against World Bank policies. Until recently
he held the position of the chief economist at the World Bank and
made himself deeply unpopular with the orthodoxy. Following the
route shown by information economics, we now understand in a
deeper way the problems of simple-minded shock therapy prescribed
by the World Bank and the IMF (alternatively referred to as the
Washington Consensus) for reforming economies. The Washington
Consensus took, according to Stiglitz, ``an ideological,
fundamental, root-and-branch approach to reform as opposed to an
incremental, remedial, piecemeal, adaptive approach''. He
attributes the glaring failure of shock therapy in the transition
economies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to their
advisers' failure to understand modern capitalism. It was not
just the result of poor implementation of sound policies, but
also of a failure to understand that the success of a market
economy crucially depends on supporting institutions, such as a
suitable legal framework and social norms favouring compliance
with the rules of the game. It is the profound insight of
information economics that would help us reject both kinds of
fundamentalism - a simple-minded blitzkrieg approach to `level
the evil institutions of socialism', on the one hand, and the
`market-is-what-we-have-instead-of-the-devil' approach, on the
other.
(The writer is Associate Fellow, Centre for Development Studies,
Thiruvananthapuram.)
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