Securing Pak. nuclear arsenal

By C. Raja Mohan

WASHINGTON, OCT. 24. The likelihood of the United States acting unilaterally to take out Pakistani nuclear weapons to prevent them from falling into the hands of extremist elements is considered here to be an extremely remote one.

As a shaky Pakistan confronts the contradictions of becoming the frontline state in the current war against international terrorism, the safety and security of the nuclear arsenal there is generating considerable concern here.

There have been some public calls in the United States for contingency planning that would allow American forces to remove the nuclear weapons out of Pakistan, without the permission of the Pak. Army if necessary.

A leading American expert on nuclear command and control, Mr. Bruce Blair, wrote in the New York Times this week that the American Special Operation forces ``should be kept on high alert for quick, covert incursions to disable or even relocate the weapons to prevent their capture by unauthorised people''.

He added that ``nuclear emergency search teams, which are trained in bomb detection and dismantling, should be ready to accompany such military operations''.

Mr. Blair went on, ``the teams, some from Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, know the basic design of Pakistani weapons from defectors' reports and could devise disabling procedures on the spot.''

But most knowledgeable sources here insist that such a contingency may not arise. Even if it arises it would be rather difficult for the U.S. forces to act against the wishes of the Pakistan Army.

There is a general sense of comfort here that the Pakistani Army is in effective control of the nation's nuclear weapons. But no one is willing to speculate on the various aspects of contingency planning for extreme situations that might develop in the future.

It has been reported here that there already has been some discussion between the Bush Administration and Islamabad on strengthening safety aspects of the Pak. nuclear arsenal.

The Administration has reportedly been debating the merits of extending some assistance to Pakistan to improve the control of nuclear weapons.

Before September 11, the U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, has been on record stating that the U.S. should recognise the reality of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent and should focus on making them safe and secure.

While the issue has acquired new salience after September 11, the nature and extent of the U.S. nuclear stability assistance to Pakistan is likely to constrained by the U.S. committments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. Michael Krepon, president-emeritus of the Stimson Centre, here suggests that the U.S. should ``steer clear'' of helping Pakistan on matters of nuclear warhead design. ``That is not only contrary to our NPT obligations, but also domestic law.''

The non-proliferation community here strongly believes that the U.S. assistance to Pakistan should not improve the effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal there. They insist that U.S. help should end up making Pakistani nuclear weapons deployable and readily usable.

Mr. Krepon, however, adds that within the NPT constraints, the U.S. should be able to extend some assistance to Pakistan. ``There are a number of ways to help improve safety and security'' of Pak. arsenal ``that are entirely appropriate and lawful'', he said.

These may include, according to Mr. Krepon and others, training the Pakistani nuclear establishment in personal reliability programmes, help in surveillance, perimeter controls, and transportation.

Some experts here say whatever nuclear stability assistance that is given to Pakistan, must be above board and transparent. Otherwise, they suggest, it could raise questions about American commitment to its obligations under the NPT.

These experts also suggest whatever safety technology that is offered to Pakistan must also be shared with India. But it is not entirely clear if India, or for that matter Pakistan, will be comfortable with getting Americans too close to their nuclear establishments.

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