A defining moment for the subcontinent?

By Malini Parthasarathy

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, which a horrified world watched with incredulous revulsion, as television screens worldwide endlessly and ruthlessly replayed again and again the grisly images of the so- familiar jetliners crashing murderously into well-known landmarks, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, each a symbol of America's preeminence on the world stage, have left deep scars on the collective global psyche. It was not just the obvious shattering of the illusion of the invincibility of the United States that led to the stunning of an entire world. The thousands of people who burnt to death in the World Trade Center rubble and who were hurled with homicidal intent into the buildings included many of different ethnic and national descent, including South Asian. It was easy to identify with the horrifying images replayed endlessly on television - it could be one of us, especially the well-heeled among us, who could have been out there, either walking on the streets of Lower Manhattan or on the planes that were meant to take us to and fro on our daily business. How many Indian families have their near and dear ensconsed in what they thought was a safe and reassuring America. Just as Indians have spontaneously and unhesitatingly identified with the tragedy in America, so also must have people in other countries in East and South Asia, from where scores of young people have headed off hopefully to the United States, dreaming of a new life of achievement denied them at home. Hence the genuineness of the outpouring of grief and empathy that has accompanied the United States's deep sense of hurt.

But even as India has joined most of the world in expressing its sense of solidarity with the grievous wound inflicted on the United States by a murderous and sinister terrorist outfit which by all accounts intends to menace India too, it is important to pause and consider soberly its course of action as events following the September 11 attack have gathered speed, with an angry and embattled America now embarked on a campaign to build an anti-terror coalition, but more important gearing itself up to wade into the ``swamps'' where terrorists hide and to root out and destroy them. It is inevitable that the first target of a wrathful America which has traced the blood-curdling attacks on New York and Washington to Osama Bin Laden, would be the Taliban- ruled Afghanistan. India has little to quarrel with this campaign especially since it has been this country's painful experience that the jehadi onslaught on the Kashmir Valley has been fuelled by groups inspired by Bin Laden's hate propaganda. But it is at such moments as these, when there is a sense of validation of one's historical and political experience, that there should be no display of triumphalism and a nation-state must take careful stock of its options and the road ahead. One unexpected consequence of this turn of events, including the United States' sense of urgency in retaliating for the awful attacks, has reflected in a sudden cooption of Pakistan as a major partner in the campaign to bring Bin Laden to justice. To New Delhi which has been seething with anger at the perceived encouragement by Islamabad of jehad in Kashmir, recalling as it does the implied provocation in the Pakistan President, General Musharraf's words ``One man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter'', that the United States in its own desperation for retribution has put India's security fears on the backburner is apparently deeply galling.

To begin with, it is no surprise that the calculations of the Vajpayee administration as regards the approach of the U.S. to this region appear to have gone a little awry. Since the Kargil standoff, the United States appeared to have thrown its weight behind India, registering strong disapproval of General Musharraf's coup and the destruction of democracy in Pakistan. Thus when the Prime Minister visited Washington last fall, he and his ministerial colleagues had no difficulty in launching a virtual campaign against what they saw as Pakistan's jehad against India. It was evident that the strategic calculations of the Vajpayee regime banked too heavily on the prospect of deepening estrangement between Washington and Islamabad. These assumptions have now been upset by the sudden reversal of circumstances in the region. It is clear that if New Delhi intends to retain its strategic relevance in the new calculus, it can no longer rely on short term strategies such as playing upon the limitations of Pakistan's political situation. The very next day after the September 11 attacks, the Vajpayee administration sought to harness the new international revulsion and outrage over terrorism in an effort to freshly underline what it saw as Pakistan's own connections with the Taliban, making the point that Islamabad had been promoting terrorism.

The Union Home Minister, Mr. L.K. Advani, was quick to emphasise that Pakistan was training terrorists to kill innocent people in India and that it was continuing to give ``shelter'' to the mastermind of the serial blasts in Mumbai in 1993, Dawood Ibrahim. The reference to the Mumbai blast in the context of the New York-Washington incidents was not, strictly speaking, drawing an accurate parallel, given that the Mumbai blasts, although equally criminal in scope and equally unjustifiable, reflected deep alienation on the part of the Muslim community after the provocation of the destruction of the Babri Masjid and the riots in Mumbai. While it was a fair case to demand the extradition of Dawood Ibrahim, it has to be noted that he is an Indian citizen who is to be held to account, a case much unlike that of Bin Laden who has mounted an assault on another country. Given the traumatic events of 1992-1993 and its wounding impact on the Muslim community, Mr. Advani's reference to the Mumbai blast as a parallel for the American incidents might have limited resonance in Indian civil society and is unlikely to be given much weight in the reckoning of the international community. A parallel that has much more international resonance is of course the Kandahar hijacking which had strong jehadi connections and which did evoke worldwide empathy and in fact assistance in its unravelling by the international community.

If the Vajpayee administration intends to be effective in its effort to include itself as a relevant member of the new international coalition against terrorism that the U.S. is seeking to build, the last thing it ought to do is to reduce the credibility of its interventions by highlighting its quarrel with Pakistan at this sensitive juncture. Given the strenuous efforts being made by the United States to persuade Pakistan to provide territory from which it can launch a retaliatory strike, it is clear that the dice is currently loaded against an ambitious gamble by India to use this opportunity to link its own problem with Pakistan to the current campaign. Yet there is no question that the actual substance of an international campaign against terror would work out in India's favour. The logic of such a comprehensive operation to clean out the swamps in the region will inexorably operate to India's advantage. It is inevitable that as the Americans begin their military operations against Bin Laden and his supporters, the jehadi groups who now exist on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control will not be able to withstand the onslaught of the anti-terrorist sweep. India does not need a Pakistani President to affirm or to testify that he will take action against terrorists sneaking across the LoC, given that it is highly unlikely that these elements can survive the battle unto death that is about to be unleashed from Pakistani territory against Bin Laden and his ilk supporting jehad.

This is also ironically a moment of opportunity, a moment when both India and Pakistan can subtly alter the dynamics of the context of the bilateral relationship. If the Agra proceedings had broken down because of the failure to reconcile perceptions on cross-border terrorism, in a sense the problem has been taken out of the hands of both New Delhi and Islamabad. Instead of wasting crucial political space by adding to the pressure on a clearly besieged General Musharraf, who might represent the last frontier against jehadi extremism in Pakistan, India ought to quietly turn down the heat on Pakistan, and in fact begin a process of quiet consultations with the leadership there as with the other South Asian neighbours on the implications of these developments for this region.

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