An abyss unbridged

The Simla Agreement was an important landmark, though the signatories interpret it rather differently now. The book under review brings together an Indian and a Pakistani scholar to look at the subject from their respective perspectives. And it is largely free of polemics, says SALMAN HAIDER.

THE Simla Agreement was a momentous attempt to bring about an entirely new relationship between India and Pakistan. At Simla, leftover questions from the 1971 war were settled; more important, Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Bhutto agreed on an approach to underlying problems that promised future peace and cooperation. Sadly, the bright potential of that moment was not to be fulfilled. Yet Simla remains an important landmark, and interest in what it fully signified has never faded. By now, rather different interpretations of the Agreement have come to be established in the two countries. It is thus instructive to bring together two well-known scholars from India and Pakistan to write about the subject from their respective viewpoints.

Each of the two authors has contributed a long essay, the two halves of the book lying side by side, yet not fully matched. Chari's is a close focus on the Agreement itself, how it was reached, what it signifies. Cheema ranges further afield, describing the wellsprings of Pakistan's foreign policy and providing also an elaborate comparison between the Agreements of Simla in 1972 and Tashkent in 1966. One could wish for tighter editing so that both were restricted to the same essentials. Indeed, the two authors could have attempted a closer collaboration where their respective virtues would have complemented each other, Chari being knowledgeable from the inside of how government works, Cheema having a wider academic range. Nevertheless, what we have is largely objective and free of polemics, and amounts to a useful addition to the literature on this important subject.

The core of Chari's version is a close reconstruction of what actually happened at and around Simla. He delves deep into the contemporary media and other published accounts, eked out by personal interviews - the official record remains out of reach. There are some gaps, as access to Pakistani sources may have been hard to come by. Even so, he does a competent job in building up a picture of the complex events of that time. He leads us through the different stages of the negotiations, highlighting the contentious issues and describing the main features of the final Agreement. Cheema is more discursive though he covers the same ground, and on some of the issues the two authors have similar views. Thus they agree that Simla gained for India the important notion that problems had to be solved bilaterally, while Pakistan gained the adoption of a step-by-step approach, which suited its interests at that point. They note, too, Pakistan's insistence on treating Kashmir as the "core issue" while India pressed hard for a wider agenda; also the solemn commitment of the leaders to meet again at another Summit - in this, almost a preview of the Agra meeting 29 years later.

Where the authors emphatically disagree is on whether or not there was any secret - or at least tacit - agreement that the Line of Control (LOC) should progressively assume the features of an international frontier. Authoritative reports to this effect came out in India a few years ago, to indignant repudiation across the border, where they were seen as a devious move to mortify Pakistan. In India, too, there were critics who decried the verbal, unspecified nature of the reported agreement. However, this aspect of Simla today overshadows the formal part of it, forcing consideration of its authenticity and of the reasons why it failed to materialise. Both authors go into it in some depth: Cheema is ultimately dismissive, while Chari finds reason to support it, adding useful information from his own researches.

Chari is critical of India's handling of the Prisoners of War (POW) issue which at Simla became intertwined with the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. As he sees it, India's failure to resolve this matter through excessive regard for Bangladesh was to have damaging consequences, for, it soon introduced a contentious note that served to hold up the implementation of the Agreement. Cheema is also critical but for very different reasons: reflecting the passions of the time, he sets aside India's supposed need to coordinate with Bangladesh on this matter as nothing but an attempt to bring pressure on Pakistan.

The differences between the two authors reflect the deep divisions between their countries. Briefly at Simla there was a bridging of the Indo-Pak abyss. As Cheema puts it, the Agreement came about through "the determination of the two leaders to make it a success". It was not expected to end there, and much more was to follow. But that is not what happened. Deeply entrenched suspicions and lack of mutual trust soon re-surfaced, and hostile exchanges between the two countries revived. The authors chart some part of this process and try to place Simla within it. It is no reflection on them that they are no more able than anyone else to explain convincingly why the Simla spirit withered away.

The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise, P. R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Manohar, 2001, p.218. Rs. 390.

The writer served as India's Foreign Secretary.

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