Maintaining the sanctity of LoC

By K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, AUG. 7. The recent Pakistani effort to reinterpret the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir is seen here as inducting an ominous factor in the dealings between India and Pakistan. It is considered worrying on another count, too - as a bid to wriggle out of solemn commitments between the two Governments in the past.

Just before the Agra summit, New Delhi became aware of a material distinction made by Islamabad between the LoC and the international border. It was coupled with the implied but none too subtle suggestion, that the LoC was crossable by ``freedom fighters''. This argument was pursued at Agra as well and was one of the major causes for the inability of the two heads - the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and the Pakistan President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf - to agree on a joint declaration.

India, as was known, was keen on a reference to cross- border terrorism and the importance of putting an end to it for the sake of normality in the State and for reducing tensions in its relations with Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf rejected the suggestion, saying there was no international border but an LoC in most parts of the State. This, along with the Pakistani insistence on characterising the ``jehadi'' butchers as freedom fighters meant that a grim view had not to be taken of what India regarded as the movement of terrorists across the LoC, but Pakistan saw as a part of the freedom struggle. India could not have accepted this position, especially when the terroristic operations had been systematically organised with the help of Pakistani agencies and when they provided material assistance in the form of arms, training and money, while maintaining the facade of ``political, moral and diplomatic help''.

Any move to dilute the sanctity of the LoC was fraught with dangerous consequences, for if it could be violated by the bands of terrorists from the Pakistani side, it could as well be crossed by the Indian troops from their direction in ``hot pursuit''. Realising the drastic implications of such an action, the Indian Government, in pursuance of a considered policy decision, had decided against it, rejecting the suggestions by fringe elements within the country. It was this caution that weighed with the Indian security forces in not advancing across the LoC during the Kargil conflict, though they could have cut their losses by doing so. And it was this sanctity that led the then U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton, to prevail upon the Pakistan Prime Minister of the day, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, to withdraw its troops from the Indian side of the LoC in Kargil. It was a different story that Mr. Sharif's action in July 1999 provoked the military leadership of Pakistan into removing him from power a few months later.

That the LoC was meant to be respected by the two sides (just as an international border is accepted) is evident from the relevant provision of the Shimla Agreement. According to it, ``in Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire line of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line.''

The decision to convert the ceasefire line into the LoC was no flash-in-the-pan affair but the outcome of serious negotiations. India agreed to Bhutto's request for not inserting in the agreement the joint support for the gradual graduation of the LoC into an international border. The phrase ``without prejudice to the recognised position of either side'' was a concession to Bhutto to save him from domestic embarrassment. At the same time, the second and third paras of the Kashmir-related clause were meant to prevent the abuse of this concession and to lay the foundation for a future settlement of the Kashmir issue, according to the inside accounts of the Shimla talks. It is ironic that the Pakistani reinterpretation of the LoC has become an impediment in the efforts for a ``future settlement''.

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