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Online edition of India's National Newspaper Tuesday, July 24, 2001 |
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Dialogue without illusions
By Husain Haqqani
THE AGRA summit marks the revival of a dialogue that could take a
long time to conclude. Gen. Pervez Musharraf returned home with
enhanced prestige and the credit of being able to state
Pakistan's position over Kashmir without mincing words. As
officials from both sides are now explaining to the world, the
summit marked the beginning of a process and should be seen as
inconclusive, not as a failure. The process of finding lasting
solutions to intractable disputes involving nations is
painstaking and time-consuming. Its success cannot be measured in
terms of the ability of statesmen and diplomats to agree on the
wording of a joint declaration. Even if a joint declaration had
been signed at Agra, its significance would have been no more
than that of a similar declaration issued at Lahore two years
ago, which failed to prevent the Kargil conflict. Perhaps it is a
good thing that such a declaration was not signed. Gen. Musharraf
gave his Indian interlocutors a straightforward understanding of
what peace with India means to Pakistanis. He told Indian editors
that a deal excluding Jammu and Kashmir would be unrealistic and
would amount to living in a make-believe world. Gen. Musharraf
has paved the way for future negotiations between India and
Pakistan, if and when the Indians are ready to tackle the core
issue. His trip to New Delhi and Agra has shattered the taboos
created by extremists in Pakistan about talking to the Indians.
Now, the process of dialogue with India can be continued even by
civilian leaders without the fear of being accused of selling out
Pakistan's national interest.
Hardly anyone in Pakistan expected the Indians to give up their
traditional, intransigent position on Jammu and Kashmir just for
the success of a summit. The Indians, on the other hand, were
living in a illusory world if they thought that the dialogue
could move forward without serious discussions over the Kashmir
issue. What failed at Agra was the euphoria, generated mainly by
the Indian media, that differences between India and Pakistan can
somehow be significantly minimised through a single summit.
At the heart of the Indian media's euphoric attitude before the
summit and its disappointment at its inconclusive end is a major
misperception about the nature of the conflict between India and
Pakistan. Conventional wisdom in India holds that only the
Pakistani establishment, and not the Pakistani people, feels
strongly about the Kashmir issue and that it is the establishment
that needs to be brought round to the idea of normalisation of
relations between the two countries. Based on this assessment,
India continually looks for the `right person' to deal with on
behalf of the Pakistani establishment. Indian analysts repeatedly
pinned their optimism about an agreement at Agra on the fact that
Gen. Musharraf represented `the hardline military constituency'
and that he wields total power. The thrust of the Indian
endeavour was to convince the wielder of total power in Pakistan
of the value of an India-Pakistan agreement, without
acknowledging the centrality of the Kashmir issue. Several
arguments were put forward to make the case that a General from
Pakistan and a Hindu nationalist from India were the most
suitable partners in overcoming 54 years of hostility. One of
these was the success of Richard Nixon, an ardent anti-communist,
in initiating U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China.
Ironically, the Nixon analogy had also been cited at the time of
the Lahore summit in 1999. On that occasion it had been said that
a Punjabi leader from Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, was most suited
as a peace-maker because most Pakistani military men are Punjabis
and Punjab is the bastion of anti-India sentiment in Pakistan.
The desire in India to look for a Pakistani leader who can make
peace without any concessions by New Delhi over Jammu and Kashmir
is not new. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru saw Ayub Khan as a
sufficiently strong leader to cut a deal. Rajiv Gandhi's
Islamabad visit during the SAARC summit of 1989 was preceded by
comments that two leaders unaffected by the bitterness of
Partition (Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto) would be the most
suitable partners in peace making. But, as Gen. Musharraf rightly
pointed out during his meeting with Indian editors, resolution of
disputes between nations is not about their leaders charming each
other and finding the right phrases for a joint statement. It is
about addressing the issues that keep the nations apart in the
first place. No one disputes the fact that there are no permanent
enemies in international relations. Nations locked in complex
cycles of bitter rivalry have resolved their disputes to become
partners in peace. But the transition from enemy to partner
cannot be achieved overnight. It requires gradual steps, taken in
sincerity by both. Even after these steps have been taken, there
is no guarantee that historic differences can be overcome. The
Arab-Israeli peace process is a case in point.
In fact, those who see the potential for peace under a military
leader in Pakistan and a Hindu nationalist Prime Minister in
India must turn their attention to Palestine for an alternative
analogy. The refusal by the Israelis to recognise the national
rights of Palestinians continues to undermine peace in the Middle
East. Israel has changed its leader several times but the
personality of the leaders has had no effect on the resolution of
the conflict, given the refusal to accept the right of the
Palestinians to a state of their own.
It is time the Indians stopped looking for `the right person' in
Pakistan to deal with and started exploring options for a lasting
solution in Kashmir. Nixon's opening to China is only one example
in recent history where a hardliner has overcome hostility to
create an enduring partnership between nations. There are far
more examples of situations where ideologues and hardliners have
hindered peace between historic enemies. In any case, the U.S.
and China had no territorial dispute and did not have to deal
with the unfinished business of a partition. The disagreements in
their case were political, which were overcome with the prospect
of mutual economic gain. In the case of India and Pakistan, there
are fundamental differences over what nationhood means for each
country. India insists that Kashmir is at the heart of its
secular identity. Pakistan, too, feels incomplete without the
accession of the Kashmiri Muslim population.
India and Pakistan must both go beyond their stated positions on
Kashmir to start a meaningful dialogue. There has been no
indication from India about how it will shift from its stated
position on the disputed State. For 50 years, Pakistan has
demanded the right of self-determination for Kashmiris and India
has insisted that Kashmir is its integral part and therefore a
settled matter. For a meaningful dialogue to begin and for the
process of shifting from stated positions to take place, surely
the leaders of India and Pakistan must undertake some homework
with their own constituents before hoping for a comprehensive
settlement in a summit meeting.
The post-Cold War world has seen many thorny international issues
resolved through negotiations. Others are in the process of being
resolved. But the process of dialogue in each case has been long
and difficult. In most cases, the greatest difficulty has been
encountered in dealing with the core issues. That India and
Pakistan are willing to talk to each other is an achievement in
itself. To the extent that the process of dialogue has been
resumed, the Agra summit has been a major success. But the India-
Pakistan dispute is a dispute between two nations. It cannot be
resolved by pinning hopes only on the personalities involved in
the dialogue. Instead of looking for the `one person who will
deliver peace', and being disappointed, the Indians must start
looking for solutions to the one problem that is at the heart of
the conflict. Until then, the two countries must continue with
their dialogue, without hope for a settlement.
(The writer is a Pakistani columnist who has served as adviser to
Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan's
High Commissioner to Sri Lanka.)
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