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Tuesday, July 24, 2001

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Dialogue without illusions

By Husain Haqqani

THE AGRA summit marks the revival of a dialogue that could take a long time to conclude. Gen. Pervez Musharraf returned home with enhanced prestige and the credit of being able to state Pakistan's position over Kashmir without mincing words. As officials from both sides are now explaining to the world, the summit marked the beginning of a process and should be seen as inconclusive, not as a failure. The process of finding lasting solutions to intractable disputes involving nations is painstaking and time-consuming. Its success cannot be measured in terms of the ability of statesmen and diplomats to agree on the wording of a joint declaration. Even if a joint declaration had been signed at Agra, its significance would have been no more than that of a similar declaration issued at Lahore two years ago, which failed to prevent the Kargil conflict. Perhaps it is a good thing that such a declaration was not signed. Gen. Musharraf gave his Indian interlocutors a straightforward understanding of what peace with India means to Pakistanis. He told Indian editors that a deal excluding Jammu and Kashmir would be unrealistic and would amount to living in a make-believe world. Gen. Musharraf has paved the way for future negotiations between India and Pakistan, if and when the Indians are ready to tackle the core issue. His trip to New Delhi and Agra has shattered the taboos created by extremists in Pakistan about talking to the Indians. Now, the process of dialogue with India can be continued even by civilian leaders without the fear of being accused of selling out Pakistan's national interest.

Hardly anyone in Pakistan expected the Indians to give up their traditional, intransigent position on Jammu and Kashmir just for the success of a summit. The Indians, on the other hand, were living in a illusory world if they thought that the dialogue could move forward without serious discussions over the Kashmir issue. What failed at Agra was the euphoria, generated mainly by the Indian media, that differences between India and Pakistan can somehow be significantly minimised through a single summit.

At the heart of the Indian media's euphoric attitude before the summit and its disappointment at its inconclusive end is a major misperception about the nature of the conflict between India and Pakistan. Conventional wisdom in India holds that only the Pakistani establishment, and not the Pakistani people, feels strongly about the Kashmir issue and that it is the establishment that needs to be brought round to the idea of normalisation of relations between the two countries. Based on this assessment, India continually looks for the `right person' to deal with on behalf of the Pakistani establishment. Indian analysts repeatedly pinned their optimism about an agreement at Agra on the fact that Gen. Musharraf represented `the hardline military constituency' and that he wields total power. The thrust of the Indian endeavour was to convince the wielder of total power in Pakistan of the value of an India-Pakistan agreement, without acknowledging the centrality of the Kashmir issue. Several arguments were put forward to make the case that a General from Pakistan and a Hindu nationalist from India were the most suitable partners in overcoming 54 years of hostility. One of these was the success of Richard Nixon, an ardent anti-communist, in initiating U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China. Ironically, the Nixon analogy had also been cited at the time of the Lahore summit in 1999. On that occasion it had been said that a Punjabi leader from Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, was most suited as a peace-maker because most Pakistani military men are Punjabis and Punjab is the bastion of anti-India sentiment in Pakistan.

The desire in India to look for a Pakistani leader who can make peace without any concessions by New Delhi over Jammu and Kashmir is not new. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru saw Ayub Khan as a sufficiently strong leader to cut a deal. Rajiv Gandhi's Islamabad visit during the SAARC summit of 1989 was preceded by comments that two leaders unaffected by the bitterness of Partition (Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto) would be the most suitable partners in peace making. But, as Gen. Musharraf rightly pointed out during his meeting with Indian editors, resolution of disputes between nations is not about their leaders charming each other and finding the right phrases for a joint statement. It is about addressing the issues that keep the nations apart in the first place. No one disputes the fact that there are no permanent enemies in international relations. Nations locked in complex cycles of bitter rivalry have resolved their disputes to become partners in peace. But the transition from enemy to partner cannot be achieved overnight. It requires gradual steps, taken in sincerity by both. Even after these steps have been taken, there is no guarantee that historic differences can be overcome. The Arab-Israeli peace process is a case in point.

In fact, those who see the potential for peace under a military leader in Pakistan and a Hindu nationalist Prime Minister in India must turn their attention to Palestine for an alternative analogy. The refusal by the Israelis to recognise the national rights of Palestinians continues to undermine peace in the Middle East. Israel has changed its leader several times but the personality of the leaders has had no effect on the resolution of the conflict, given the refusal to accept the right of the Palestinians to a state of their own.

It is time the Indians stopped looking for `the right person' in Pakistan to deal with and started exploring options for a lasting solution in Kashmir. Nixon's opening to China is only one example in recent history where a hardliner has overcome hostility to create an enduring partnership between nations. There are far more examples of situations where ideologues and hardliners have hindered peace between historic enemies. In any case, the U.S. and China had no territorial dispute and did not have to deal with the unfinished business of a partition. The disagreements in their case were political, which were overcome with the prospect of mutual economic gain. In the case of India and Pakistan, there are fundamental differences over what nationhood means for each country. India insists that Kashmir is at the heart of its secular identity. Pakistan, too, feels incomplete without the accession of the Kashmiri Muslim population.

India and Pakistan must both go beyond their stated positions on Kashmir to start a meaningful dialogue. There has been no indication from India about how it will shift from its stated position on the disputed State. For 50 years, Pakistan has demanded the right of self-determination for Kashmiris and India has insisted that Kashmir is its integral part and therefore a settled matter. For a meaningful dialogue to begin and for the process of shifting from stated positions to take place, surely the leaders of India and Pakistan must undertake some homework with their own constituents before hoping for a comprehensive settlement in a summit meeting.

The post-Cold War world has seen many thorny international issues resolved through negotiations. Others are in the process of being resolved. But the process of dialogue in each case has been long and difficult. In most cases, the greatest difficulty has been encountered in dealing with the core issues. That India and Pakistan are willing to talk to each other is an achievement in itself. To the extent that the process of dialogue has been resumed, the Agra summit has been a major success. But the India- Pakistan dispute is a dispute between two nations. It cannot be resolved by pinning hopes only on the personalities involved in the dialogue. Instead of looking for the `one person who will deliver peace', and being disappointed, the Indians must start looking for solutions to the one problem that is at the heart of the conflict. Until then, the two countries must continue with their dialogue, without hope for a settlement.

(The writer is a Pakistani columnist who has served as adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka.)

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