Consensus on Pak. policy crumbling

By K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, JULY 23. It is a pity that the national consensus on foreign policy - on Pakistan - appears to be collapsing within weeks after it found an impressive demonstration. The Opposition parties which extended full support to the Government on the stand to be taken at the Agra summit are highly critical on various counts. Apart from other things, they are angry that the Pakistan President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, was allowed to take an unearned advantage out of his encounter with the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and that India slumped in the face of propaganda onslaughts from the other side. In the midst of heat and acrimony, a distinction needs to be made between the national policy on Pakistan and the conduct of the Indian side in the discussions at Agra. Unfortunately, this dividing line was blurred in the last three or four days, as the outcome of the summit was scrutinised closely. As a result, there was the danger of the nation projecting a divided face on a matter that calls for complete unity of purpose. This will need to be avoided in discussions in Parliament and outside.

At the summit, Mr. Vajpayee was, no doubt, able to counter Gen. Musharraf's unifocal approach, pointing to the holes in the Pakistani arguments on the ``core issue'' and projecting a balanced vision of Indo-Pakistan relations and its significance for peace and security in South Asia. But that is not the impression conveyed to the country and, perhaps, abroad. Pakistan has been able to spread the belief that a mutually acceptable draft of a joint declaration was almost ready but could not be adopted because of back-tracking by India under the pressure of hardliners in the establishment. Nothing is farther from truth. If the joint declaration did not materialise, it was because of Pakistan's obsessive concern with its line on Kashmir and because of its insistence on inserting a Kashmir-related overriding clause. The Pakistan Information Secretary was on record as having told mediapersons at Agra that ``there were some difficulties, of crucial importance to Pakistan, in a draft, that the two Foreign Ministers were busy sorting out these points and, hopefully, an agreed document would emerge before Gen. Musharraf's departure.'' It did not happen. But how many people in India knew that this was the case?

This was an inexcusable failure of New Delhi's dealings with the media, both domestic and foreign. The background briefings of the type that had been a normal feature on such occasions in the past were conspicuous by their absence before, during and immediately after the summit. The yawning gaps in the contacts between the media personnel and officials concerned made matters worse. As already pointed out, the Foreign Office spokesperson found herself in an unenviable position, for no fault of hers, in the absence of a clear strategy and a plan, worked out in advance. Quite a lot could be conveyed to the media without breaching the norms of confidentiality, now cited by the Government to cover up its lapse.

There is a case for ensuring that the polemics on the official handling do not come in the way of New Delhi's pursuit of the peace process. The question is not whether the summit was a success or a failure but whether the two Governments could muster the requisite political will to continue the dialogue, resumed after a gap of two years. The two sides should be free to pick up the thread from where it was left at the agreed level at Agra or to break new ground. As for Pakistan, the ``political will'' includes its readiness to keep a tight rein on the jehadi butchers, working havoc in the valley. Laughable, indeed, is the Pakistani stand on India's worry over trans-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir - that, in most part of the State's territory, it is the Line of Control (LoC) and not a border. Apart from indulging in the petty game of semantics, Islamabad forgets that the LoC came into being as part of the accord which enabled the repatriation of 93,000 Pakistani troops, who had surrendered to India, and that it has the force and sanctity of a border.

India's case is strong, howsoever viewed, but it suffers because of faulty projection and the lack of demonstrable faith in it by all sections in the country on all occasions. Take, Gen. Musharraf's contention that the Shimla Agreement did not address the Kashmir issue and, as such, he felt duty-bound to restore its centrality. A cursory reading of the agreement, solemnly accepted by the then President of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, in talks with the Prime Minister of the day here, Indira Gandhi, would show, that Kashmir engaged their attention at some length. Had that not been the case, the agreement would not have contained this clause - ``In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.'' It also shows that terrorism, whether cross-border or cross-LoC, is not permissible under the agreement, solemnly reached between the heads of the two Governments.

What Bhutto accepted in private (and pleaded not to be made public for a while) should be a source of greater embarrassment to the General - Bhutto agreed to the virtual conversion of the LoC into an international border.

Equally untenable is the General's stand that Kashmir did not figure at Lahore. The very first operative clause of the Lahore Declaration (after the preamble) spoke of their commitment ``to intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.''

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