Indo-Russian military cooperation

By P. R. Chari

SENIOR MINISTRY of Defence (MoD) officials recently briefed a group of defence analysts on the Foreign and Defence Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh's visit to Russia earlier this month. Military cooperation between India and the erstwhile Soviet Union dates back to the late 1950s and its growth can be linked to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. They gained momentum in the 1960s after the Sino- Indian border conflict; the exigencies of the crisis led India to undertake a massive increase and upgradation of its armed forces which was unreservedly supported by the Soviet Union.

The supplier-recipient relationship has consolidated due to the umbilical cord established by India's need for spares and ancillaries to maintain its weapons systems procured from the Soviets and the Soviet need for exploiting the large Indian arms market. Thus India's efforts to diversify its sources of arms supply in the past have not proceeded very far, since 70-80 per cent of its military equipment is of Eastern origin. The sanctions imposed by the United States and Western powers following Pokhran I and II have added to India's dependence on Eastern sources for military equipment. The end of the Cold War, followed by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and independence gained by several former Soviet Republics from Russia, however, led to two major problems confronting this military cooperation relationship.

First, the Yeltsin/ Kozyrev era witnessed the Kremlin's domination by a West-oriented, Atlanticist group, which had an inherent anti-India bias. This was clear from their reluctance to supply the contracted cryogenic engines for India's GSLV (Geo- Synchronous Launch Vehicle) programme and the exacerbation of Indo-Russian disputes regarding debt scheduling and the rupee- rouble exchange rate. Following the elevation of Primakov as the Russian Prime Minister a greater balance came about between the Western and Orientalist factions in the Kremlin leading to an improvement in Indo-Russian relations. This manifested itself in a resolution of the cryogenic engines, debt scheduling and exchange rate issues, but also in Russia's decision to proceed with the supply of two 1000 MW reactors for the Koodankulam Atomic Power Plant. Russia's recent decision to cooperate with India in all areas of energy security further demonstrates its desire to broaden bilateral cooperation.

Another reason for the sharp deterioration in military cooperation in the early 1990s was the chaos prevailing in the Russian and former Soviet Republics. This disrupted the pipeline for provision of arms, spares and ancillaries, since no central authority could be identified to ensure their regular supply. Russia has now agreed to coordinate supplies from the other ex- Soviet Republics. The Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin, has also issued a decree to expedite arms supplies. The recently held Indo-Russian meeting decided to establish a time-bound programme to mitigate delays, and the progress achieved is to be reviewed at regular half-yearly intervals.

Since 1996, this cooperation is being brought onto an even keel. Quite apart from the reality that India's military equipment is mostly of ex-Soviet origin, there is the ineluctable fact that this equipment suits the Indian military better. Western equipment may be more sophisticated and inter-generational improvements could be more radical. But Russia equipment is more rugged and the changes introduced between one generation and another are incremental. What this implies is fewer problems in inducting new weapon systems by way of training personnel, or integration into maintenance and logistical systems. Indubitably, Russia now charges market prices that are designated in dollar terms but, in comparison to Western prices, these are very competitive, since these exports are its major source of revenue. The Indian market is important to Russia because of its size, only comparable to China. India contracted for some $10 billion worth of arms purchases from the Russian defence industry over the last four years.

Russian interests become clear from its willingness to supply the most sophisticated weapon systems to India; these were discussed in the recent parleys. They include the ``Smerch'' rocket launcher system, the ``Admiral Gorshkov'' aircraft career along with a complement of Russian aircraft, the II-76 based AWACS-50 (Airborne Warning and Communications System) and mid-air refuellers to increase the range of long-range bombers. Interestingly, India has decided to evaluate the MiG-AT and Yak- 130, which are the Russian versions of the (AJT) Advanced Jet Trainer. This suggests that price negotiations for the British Hawk AJT, which was the front- runner so far, are running into difficulties. Agreements have also been finalised in the recent past or are under negotiation for the supply of Su- 30 bombers and Tu-22 strike aircraft; upgrading the MiG-21 fleet to extend its useful life; procuring the S-300 anti-ballistic missile system along with Pechora-II surface-to-air missiles for establishing a missile defence system against Pakistan; and T-90 tanks for the Army. The point here is that Russia is willing to supply India anything it requires, without linking its arms exports to non-proliferation concerns, which obsesses the U.S. and its Western allies.

There are several related directions in which Indo-Russian military cooperation would be extended that were discussed in the recent meeting. First, the joint development and production of hi-tech system such as fifth generation aircraft and a passenger- cum-cargo aircraft that would be undertaken on a 50-50 cost- sharing basis. Second, as a logical corollary, it was also decided to intensify lab-to-lab cooperation; this would support the joint development and production projects chosen for pursuit, besides extending military cooperation beyond its present confines of a buyer-seller relationship. Third, the possibility of exports to Third World countries was also agreed to be explored on a case-by-case basis to cater for the strategic sensitivities of both countries. Fourth, the area of staff exercises (exercises without the use of troops) on a Service-to- Service basis is to be promoted. The Russian interest arises from the range of terrain available in India, ranging from high altitudes to desert to jungle areas which would be instructive for the Russian military to familiarise themselves with for future operations. Fifth, subscribing to training programmes for armed forces officers in both countries. Sixth, it was decided to evolve a common strategy to combat terrorism in Afghanistan, which threatens both countries.

The intensification of Indo-Russian relations subsumes the larger question of strategic direction. Is India deliberately trying to balance its relations with Russia and the U.S.? The immediate purpose might be to moderate its ardent, if somewhat hasty, approval of the Bush initiative on the NMD. Apparently, the question did come up during the recent discussions in Moscow. India's three-legged approach to the NMD was explained to include willingness to discuss new strategic ideas to replace the present concept of nuclear deterrence, support for verifiable reduction of nuclear arsenals, and opposition to abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Since the NMD cannot be established without abrogating the ABM Treaty, and the U.S. will not reduce its nuclear arsenals without the NMD being in place, India has clearly backpedalled furiously away from its earlier enthusiasm for the NMD. Is India, then, forging a new type of multipolarity, building on the wreckage of its earlier policy of non-alignment? Whilst genuflecting towards multipolarity, is a new core relationship with either the U.S. or Russia under contemplation? These are the profound questions arising from India's efforts to intensify military cooperation relations with Russia whilst deepening its linkages with the U.S. They need more serious consideration by the Government and the strategic elite in the country.

(The writer is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.)

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