Follow-up more crucial than dialogue

By K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, JUNE 25. The most important factor about next month's summit is the most obvious - restoration of trust and mutual confidence is a must for a meaningful advance towards India- Pakistan amity. The experience of the last two such exercises was far from happy, though each one of the two top-level contacts - at Shimla in 1972 and at Lahore in 1999 - concluded on notes of supreme satisfaction. Major snags developed subsequently and, as a result, the gains could not be sustained. The reason - continued distrust came in the way of implementing the agreements and undertakings. On paper the documents summing up the outcome of their labours looked fine, the assurances conveyed privately and informally sounded promising. In practice, however, there was no change in the old mindset. As seen by India, Pakistan did not live up to the agreements and solemn assurances. Hopefully, it will be a different - and a pleasant - story now.

No one in India and for that matter in Pakistan, is that unrealistic as to pin high hopes on the interaction between the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and the Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf, but, nonetheless, its significance is not minimised. There is the modest expectation that they may set in motion an engagement process, structured or informal. The follow-up of whatever decision is taken by the two leaders will be of crucial significance. The key point will be whether the agreement, even though modest, is sought to be worked in the spirit in which it is finalised.

There would have been no need to emphasise this point, had this simple logic been observed in the past two occasions.

To take the second case first, the very act of Mr. Vajpayee undertaking a bus journey to Lahore, the tone and tenor of his talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the declaration, signed by them, the memorandum of understanding on nuclear confidence building measures evoked tremendous euphoria. What happened soon after is fresh in the people's memory. Kargil not only undid Lahore, but also inflicted additional serious damage to the bilateral ties, already strained. The very thought that the plans for the Kargil invasion were underway, when Mr. Nawaz Sharif affixed his signatures to the Lahore Declaration was seen as a great betrayal, a stab in the back, because of which New Delhi found it hard to persuade itself to resume the dialogue with Islamabad - especially when the architect of Kargil was the new ruler. The casualties of Kargil included the back-channel diplomacy before, during and shortly after Lahore.

In 1972, the Shimla Agreement between Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister, and Z. A. Bhutto, then President of Pakistan, laid down several wholesome propositions. This one, for instance: ``that the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to peaceful and harmonious relations.'' Then there was the joint commitment to respect the line of control. Bhutto, it was known, had agreed to the conversion of the LoC into international border but wanted it to be a gradual process to prepare public opinion in his country. As disclosed by Mr. P. N. Dhar, Secretary to Indira Gandhi, who was privy to the delicate discussions, in an article in a national daily in 1995, Bhutto agreed not only to change the ceasefire line into a line of control, for which he had earlier proposed the term `line of peace' but agreed that the line would be gradually endowed with the `characteristics of an international border'. Indira Gandhi agreed to accommodate Bhutto and this point was not incorporated in the formal agreement, or in any additional secret pact. India, a victor, according to policy- makers, did not want to appear vindictive, reminding their colleagues that the Treaty of Versailles had been the basis of another war.

This disclosure was widely noted and commented upon in Pakistan. A leading intellectual, Humayun Gauhar, had this to say: ``If it took a private talk between Mr. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi in which he made certain commitments to her but which he was clever enough not to have written down in the Shimla Agreement or on a separate piece of paper, then it was diplomatic artistry of the highest order. He would have known better than anyone else that such a private secret agreement, which is only verbal, was worthless. Face it Mr. Dhar, even if we accept what you say, Mr. Bhutto fooled your prime minister.''

Let there be no more fooling now. Peace and security of the sub- continent is a serious matter.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : National
Previous : Inquiry report within a week
Next     : India, Sri Lanka to evolve strategy in patenting