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Online edition of India's National Newspaper Tuesday, June 19, 2001 |
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QRs' removal: Fears come true
By Prem Shankar Jha
For eight months I have been expressing the fear in these columns
that the removal of all remaining quantitative restrictions on
imports is being carried out at a time when it could lead to the
de-industrialisation of India. My reasons were as follows: First,
QRs were being removed when industry was in a deep slump, and
consumer demand was stagnant. This meant that any increase in
imports of consumer goods would take place directly at the
expense of domestic production. This would squeeze profit margins
further, and cause weaker enterprises to fail.
Second, Imports were bound to rise because, at the existing
exchange rate of Rs. 46-47 to the dollar, costs of production in
India were far, far higher than in the countries of East and
Southeast Asia, and especially China. So great was the difference
that consumer goods imports had been rising in 2000-01 even
before the relaxation of QRs had been completed.
Third, Indian manufacturers of consumer goods had already done
their sums and realised that even the 30 to 50 per cent duty that
India could levy on most manufactured consumer goods would not
suffice to shield them, especially when the higher quality of
imported consumer goods was taken into account. There was thus a
disturbingly large amount of episodic evidence that Indian
companies were planning to source their consumer goods from China
and elsewhere in Asia, for sale under their brand names in India.
Fourth, this shift from domestic to foreign sourcing - what is
called outsourcing in the voluminous literature on globalisation,
and the consequent de-industrialisation of the mature industrial
economies - has been made especially easy because of a structural
feature that is unique to Indian industry. Thanks to the
reservation of the production of most consumer goods for the
small-scale sector, our so-called manufacturers are actually only
traders. They have invested next to nothing in the manufacturing
facility, and therefore have nothing to lose by shifting their
source of supply to another company or another country. On the
contrary, if they can increase their profit or market share by
doing so they would be mad not to do so. That is precisely what
some of the largest makers of 'white' and other Fast Moving
Consumer Goods have been saying in defence of their decision:
"All my competitors are doing it. If I do not, I will be ruined".
Fifth, de-industrialisation is likely to be especially rapid
because while the marketers are going to China, the actual small
and medium scale manufacturers, who relied exclusively on them in
the past, have no marketing expertise and therefore will soon
find themselves operating blind in this new open environment.
Sixth, these manufacturers are in no position to bring down their
costs. The main reasons are high rates of interest, power costs,
and prohibitive levels of extortion by an army of petty
bureaucrats. They have no control over any of these elements of
cost.Finally, devaluation, the only way to make imports more
expensive in the short run, is ruled out by India's high interest
rates, which are in turn a reflection of its high fiscal deficit
and heavy annual borrowing from the household sector. This is
something that even the central government is powerless to
change. My fears were scoffed at. De-industrialisation is a rich
countries' disease, I was told. How can a poor developing country
with such low wages suffer from it? Competition and a profit
squeeze were, in any case, good for industry. There was too much
flab on manufacturing costs - accumulated during years of
protected living. Manufacturers would be forced to shed it. If
some weak companies folded, so much the better. The rest would
emerge stronger.
The clinching argument, however, was that there was no
statistical evidence to confirm my fears. QRs on most FMCGs had
actually been removed last year. While there had been a sharp
increase in imports from China, this had taken place over a small
base. Overall, non-oil imports had actually shrunk. This year
too, the preliminary data for April, the first month after the
removal of all remaining QRs had shown a further decline in non-
POL imports of a whopping 14.5 per cent, and no increase in
consumer goods imports.
Nonetheless, the Government would keep a close watch on consumer
goods imports. To do so it had restricted the import of 300
sensitive items to 14 entry points (labour related) in order to
facilitate monitoring. The data for April showed that the import
of these 300 items had actually shrunk by 30 per cent.
The arguments sounded persuasive, and I was reassured. Till I
examined them more closely. The argument that freer imports and a
profit squeeze would be good for industry was pure textbook
economics. Its main flaw was the implicit adoption of assumptions
drawn from the micro-economic theory of perfect competition -
that the policy environment was neutral and that entrepreneurs
had control of all elements of cost and were therefore to blame
if they could not meet competition from more efficient rivals.
Nothing could be farther from the truth in the Indian case. The
fact that some of the Government's most respected economists were
making it suggested that they did not have the faintest idea of
what was actually happening to industry.
A closer look at the import data also shows that the Government's
complacency is groundless. First, the import of the 300 sensitive
items seems to have come down mainly because routing it through
only 14 entry points created bottlenecks. This was tacitly
conceded by the government two weeks ago when it lifted the
restriction and in effect abandoned the attempt at close
monitoring. One will therefore have to wait till the data for
June come in, to see what the effect of removing the QRs has
been. Secondly, a close look at CMIE's compilation for the import
of the 300 sensitive items in April shows that the entire
decrease of 30 per cent is accounted for solely by the fall in
import of edible oils. Furthermore, whereas the import of
agricultural products and some basic raw materials like rubber ,
has gone down by 39 to 99 per cent, there is an ominous item
called 'others' accounting for a quarter of total imports, that
has increased by 332 per cent!
To top it off, the episodic evidence of de-industrialisation
continues to grow, and is coming together to form a pattern. A
survey by a financial daily has shown that almost 1,000 Indian
firms have been forced by the slump in domestic demand, squeeze
on profit margins, high cost of investment and poor
infrastructure, to invest their funds in manufacturing ventures
abroad. At least a hundred of them have done so specifically to
produce goods more cheaply and of better quality for the home
market. The most recent addition to their ranks is the tyre
major, Apollo Tyres, which is looking for a firm to buy in China.
What is truly disturbing is that Apollo is not the first tyre
manufacturer who has gone abroad for a production base or for
supplies. Most of the others have already done so and have struck
deals to market Chinese light commercial vehicle tyres in India.
The reason they have done so is that while an Indian truck tyre
costs Rs. 9,000, Chinese tyres can be sold in the domestic market
after paying duty , for Rs. 5,000.
The reason why the outsourcing of consumer goods has not yet
shown up fully in the import data, is that it takes a year or
more to firm up production and supply arrangements and longer to
set up production facilities abroad. While Indian officialdom is
congratulating itself on the success of its do-nothing policy on
the basis of a questionable interpretation of a single month's
data, the ground is being laid for the loss of hundreds of
thousands, perhaps millions of manufacturing jobs. The Government
is waiting for data to filter in that will tell it whether any
remedial action is needed. But the danger with relying on
statistical trends is that by the time they become apparent the
damage has already been done and is usually irremediable. It is
in fact a classic instance of closing the barn doors after the
horse has bolted.
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