In defence of Track Two diplomacy

By C. Raja Mohan

LONDON, JUNE. 3. As India and Pakistan prepare for the much sought-after engagement between the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and the Chief Executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, there is renewed energy in the so-called ``Track Two'' talks between the two sides. Along with the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles in the subcontinent during the last decade, there has been a rapid proliferation of the discussions among the chattering classes of India and Pakistan to promote peace and stability in the region.

A conference over the weekend at the picturesque Wilton Park in the English country side brought together experts from Europe and the subcontinent to consider whether the European experience in managing the Cold War has some lessons for the efforts in the subcontinent to defuse tensions between India and Pakistan.

Although it was not planned that way, the timing of the conference turned out to be perfect. Coming barely weeks before the Delhi encounter between the two leaders, the seminar explored the European experience of different negotiating styles, framing of agendas, managing public expectations, and handling complex bureaucratic powerplays.

The South Asian participants generally wary of being ``educated'' by the West ended up acknowledging the value of distilling European experience in preparing for the talks between Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf. But more fundamentally the Wilton Park conference helped dispel the widespread cynicism about the Track Two process in both India and Pakistan.

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Sceptics, particularly in the Governments of the two countries, have tended to dismiss the utility of the Track Two initiatives. They see them as ``talk shops'' among ``bleeding hearts'' and ``peaceniks'' motivated Western foundations determined to promote a dialogue between the subcontinental rivals. The sceptics do have a point but miss the big picture.

Thanks to Track Two diplomacy, there is more intensive communication today between the foreign policy elites of the two nations. The growing familiarity among the talking heads from India and Pakistan has certainly helped understand each other's concerns and at least visualise policy responses that address genuine fears on the other side. One might not agree with the argument of the ``adversary''; but talking about helps understand the context and compulsions of the other side. Track Two diplomacy has allowed retired generals, diplomats, and other former decision-makers to exchange notes on a whole range of bilateral issues and think together about solving problems between the two nations. At a time when the relations between India and Pakistan have lurched from crisis to crisis since the late 1980s, Track Two has helped sustain an element of unbroken engagement.

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The very bureaucrats and soldiers who are dismissive of the process when in Government, indeed, end up on the Indo- Pak. conference circuit. Every retirement at the top levels of the two Governments brings fresh recruits into the Track Two process. For example, Gen. V.P. Malik who recently retired as the Army Chief in India and Gen. Jehangir Karamat who was the previous boss of the Pakistan Army are today active on Track Two conferences.

The presence of many key political players from both sides of the border contributes significantly to an oral history of the complex engagement between the two nations. Given the British bureaucratic tradition of secrecy and the reluctance of the many key functionaries to write their memoirs, discussions at Track Two level provide valuable insights into the history of Indo- Pakistan relations and the dynamics of decision-making in past crises.

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What with frequent changes in Government on both sides of the border over the last decade, many faces on the Track Two circuit have often shown up in influential positions. In a celebrated instance, Mr. Abdul Sattar, present Foreign Minister of Pakistan, was called away from a Track Two conference in Washington after the military coup of 1999 by Gen. Pervez Musharraf to take charge of Islamabad's external relations.

Mr. Javed Jabbar who participates in the Neemrana dialogue between India and Pakistan became an influential adviser to Gen. Musharraf. Having quit the government after a while, he is back into the Neemrana fold. On the Indian side, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam who was active on the Track Two front became the convener of the National Security Advisory Board that was set up after the Pokhran tests of May 1998.

Few politicians on the Indian side are active on the Track Two front. But there are indeed exceptions. The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, used to participate in many regional and international seminars on foreign and defence policies when he was outside the government. From the Congress side, Mr. Mani Shankar Aiyar and Mr. Jairam Ramesh too are quite sought after in the Track Two circuit.

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Track Two is very different, however, from the so- called back channel. Track Two negotiations have no imprimatur of the Government. They involve serious engagement between influential writers, analysts and former decision-makers on problems of mutual interest for India and Pakistan. Ideas generated in the Track Two process certainly find their way into the popular debates in both countries and occasionally feed into the policy- making process.

Back channel is about unpublicised contacts between two governments. Non-officials and special emissaries might be involved in these talks, but with a very specific authority from the highest political level in both the governments. In the past key figures in Track Two diplomacy have ended up as an important back channel between New Delhi and Islamabad. The influence, if any, of Track Two diplomacy is indirect. Back channel is about direct, if somewhat secret, talks between governments.

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Mr. Niaz Naik, former Pakistan High Commissioner to India and former Foreign Secretary, is the doyen of the Track Two circuit in the subcontinent. He is the founder convener of the Neemrana group on the Pakistani side. In the few weeks between the Lahore summit between Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee in February 1999 and the onset of the Kargil conflict at the end of May, Mr. Niaz Naik is widely believed to be the back channel between the two governments.

Mr. Naik is believed to have been entrusted with the task of negotiating a possible understanding on Kashmir with the Indian Government. His meetings with the Indian counterpart, Mr. R.K. Mishra, during the Kargil conflict got wide publicity, as the cover over the back-channel diplomacy got blown.

Mr. Naik has a fund of stories to tell on the many back channel contacts between the two governments since the early 1980s. He was a key figure in the efforts of both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi to engage Gen. Zia ul Haq during the 1980s. He was an important interlocutor during the Lahore-Kargil phase of Indo- Pak. relations.

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