Turning to Musharraf

By Balraj Puri

THE UNILATERAL ceasefire announced by the Centre in Jammu and Kashmir had fizzled out and its final termination by May-end is only a formal recognition of the reality. For, it failed in its primary objective of building a constituency of peace. Neither could the security forces prevent killings of civilians nor could custodial deaths and firings on demonstrations be stopped.

According to official estimates, the militants killed over 420 civilians since the ceasefire began. No firm figures can be cited for those killed in custody and firings. But rallies against human rights violations were bigger and more widespread in the Valley than in years, possibly also because these violations followed the high expectations raised by the peace process. In the Jammu region, the peace process and re-opening of the issue of the State's status raised fears which found expression in a spate of strikes, demonstrations and police action not witnessed for years. The reactions against killings of innocents were also divided along communal lines. Killings of Hindus and Sikhs were, for instance, described by most of the dissident leaders as the work of the security forces ``to defame the ongoing freedom movement''. Thus the net effect of the unilateral ceasefire was a widening of the communal and regional gulf in the State.

At this stage, the Union Government designated Mr. K. C. Pant to talk to all sections of the people of the State. The Hurriyat Conference which had been projected by the Governments of India and Pakistan as the vital group in Kashmir rejected the offer of Mr. Pant for talks on a number of grounds. Mr. Shabir Shah, another prominent dissident leader, raised almost similar objections to the offer. Despite the media hype over his decision to send two emissaries with a letter to Mr. Pant seeking explanations, it was clear that Mr. Shah could not ignore Pakistan's reaction. This was amply borne out when he deputed the same emissaries to send an epistle to Pakistan's military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, through its High Commission in New Delhi. In any case, there was no hope for a major breakthrough in Mr. Pant's talk with the secessionist camp in Kashmir.

As the unilateral ceasefire misfired and the talks did not seem to be taking off, the Government of India decided to invite Mr. Musharraf to New Delhi for talks. That means it has realised that Pakistan matters in the response of the militants and secessionists to India's peace overtures. Did it have to go through a six-month-long exercise to understand these elementary reality? And was it necessary to pay the price it did in terms of weakening the State's political and secular fabric?

A lot of behind-the-scenes and back-channel work must have preceded the initiative the Government took six months back. The Hurriyat leaders had agreed to start bilateral talks with New Delhi in the first stage to be followed by talks with Islamabad culminating in some sort of trilateral agreement on the State's future. For this purpose, a unilateral ceasefire was not relevant. But having taken this decision, its logic should have been followed. It was addressed to the militants and not to the Hurriyat. For they alone were in direct armed conflict with the Indian forces. After they rejected it, the only other party that should have been contacted to control them or persuade them to respond was the Government of Pakistan.

If the objective was to consolidate the ceasefire as a first stage, the next alternative was to use the good offices of the Hurriyat which had offered to try to convince the Pakistan Government and the militants of the political and diplomatic benefits of accepting India's peace offer. It sought permission to send a delegation to Pakistan. At that stage, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, known for his hard line, was isolated in the seven- member Hurriyat committee which asked the Jamait-e-Islami, which he represented, to replace him with another nominee. But the Centre's prolonged indecision over issuing passports and indications from Pakistan and militants based there that the Hurriyat would not be welcome without Mr. Geelani, encouraged him to assert himself. He gave a call, for the first time, in his individual capacity, bypassing the Hurriyat, for a Statewide bandh by the Muslims which was responded to. Thus the State's politics drifted to extremism due to the actions or lack of action of the Government of India.

The controversy over the representative capacity of the Hurriyat misses the point that it alone was in a position to talk to Pakistan and militants on the issue of ending violence in the State. Having recognised it as a representative of the State's people, Pakistan could not have easily turned down its plea. If peace was the main or first objective, the cooperation of the Hurriyat was vital. But when it declares that it is not for peace for the sake of peace and talks for the sake of talks, it presumes that peace and talks imply reconciliation to the status quo and rules out the efficacy of peaceful methods to alter it. If total solution is the sole condition to end militant struggle, the Hurriyat's claim to being the sole representative of all the people of the State becomes too presumptuous.

It cannot deny that there is not a single representative in it from Jammu and Ladakh and from the non-Kashmiri speaking communities in the Valley. Even in the Kashmiri-speaking community, its representative character is challenged not only by nationalist forces, whatever be their number, but also by rival secessionist groups. Confident of its majority, its president, Mr. Abdul Ghani Bhat, offers to accept the verdict of 51 per cent whether they vote for India or Pakistan. The spirit of democracy demands that the interests of the minorities should be accommodated to the extent possible. For majoritarianism is a negation of democracy. In Canada, which constitutionally recognises the right of provinces to secede, the federal court held that this right would be valid only if it was supported by a substantial majority (though it was not defined). The argument behind this judgment was that the change of mood of a marginal population should not bind the fate of the whole population forever. Even in Kashmir, the popular mood has fluctuated between being overwhelmingly for India to against India.

Many of Pakistan's leaders are on record as having conceded that in the early years of Independence, it would have lost a plebiscite in Kashmir. Why should the verdict of the people in 2001 carry more sancity than that of, say, in 1948, 1975 or 2010? Sheikh Abdullah was closest in Kashmir's modern political history to being the sole leader of his people. But with all his greatness and unparalleled popularity, his intolerance for dissent has made no mean contribution to preventing democracy taking root in Kashmir. Some of our present misfortunes are due to that unfortunate legacy. However, despite the blind faith of the people in him, even he had the practical sense to seek broadbased consensus on the future of the State in what was called the J&K People's Convention at Srinagar in 1968. My formulation that future status of the State should keep in view the interests of its three regions and ensure regional autonomy with further devolution of power at district, block and panchayat levels was unanimously accepted as the basis for a dialogue with both India and Pakistan.

The Hurriyat president is willing to talk with the Centre if it alone is invited. In that case it cannot avoid the onus of building a broadbased consensus within the State about inter- regional and intra- regional relations. If consultation with Pakistan and non-Kashmiri people of the State on the other side of the LoC is important, no less important should be consultations with people across the Pir Panchal in Jammu and across the Zoji La pass in Ladakh.

Otherwise, even if the Centre enters into any agreement with the Hurriyat, it will not be possible for it to implement it. Nor can the Hurriyat object to the Centre's decision to have the widest consultations with people of all regions, communities and parties within the State. At some stage it must consult national parties also. The Hurriyat can maintain its status and serve the interests of the people of Kashmir Valley, its principal constituency, by trying to understand view points of those with whom it does not agree in Kashmir as also other regions and communities.

In no case is it justified in insisting that the Centre's representative should not talk to anyone else and that it alone should be recognised as the representative of the State. The claim is a patent defiance of reality. If and when it becomes a reality, it will be a totalitarian and regimented state and not a civilised, free and plural state which it ought to be.

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