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Opinion
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The neighbourhood
By K. K. Katyal
THE RECENT clash on the Bangladesh border and the heavy loss of
lives have again thrown up the multi-dimensional challenge faced
by India in its dealings with the neighbourhood. Ties with the
countries in the region, even with the exclusion of Pakistan,
have posed formidable problems, both in episodal and conceptual
terms. India is a major factor in the political agendas of the
various parties there, whether in the Government or in the
Opposition, and anti-India feelings could be generated with
incredible ease to achieve narrow political ends. The factors and
forces operating below the surface, that led to the adventurist
action of the Bangladesh Rifles, have yet to be identified but
there is little doubt - on the basis of preliminary evidence - of
the linkage with it of anti-India sentiments and anti-India
elements.
Any in-depth discussion of the ghastly episode has to deal with
1) the facts of the incident, 2) the present state of India-
Bangladesh relations (including the perception of India by
different sections), 3) India's relationship with the
neighbouring countries (except Pakistan which falls in a
different category), 4) the manner in which the Pakistan factor
impinges on New Delhi's ties with others in the region, and 5)
the lessons to be learnt from the sudden eruption.
The accounts available from different sources establish the fact
of intrusion, in the first instance, by the Bangladesh Rifles.
Had that not been the case the Bangladesh side would not have
expressed regret over the killing of the BSF personnel and
reports from Dhaka would not have ascribed the killings to local
adventurism, without the consent and knowledge of the higher-ups.
There were conflicting versions of whether there had been a
failure of intelligence or whether the authorities concerned did
not pay attention to information supplied by the local agencies
on the emerging situation on the `border. The Union Home
Minister, Mr. L. K. Advani's denial of the failure charge does
not carry conviction. Shades of Kargil.
In sharp contrast to the lapses on the ground was the handling at
the diplomatic level. ``Restraint'' was the key word. Even before
the Cabinet Committee on Security considered the situation, the
official mind was made up - that conscious steps needed to be
taken to de-escalate the situation. Both the Ministries of Home
and External Affairs made known their concern, were firm in their
postures but, otherwise, played it cool and saw to it that the
clash did not develop into a bilateral crisis. This caution came
under heavy strain when the gory details of the killing of the
BSF personnel became known. While not giving up the restraint,
New Delhi lodged a strong protest to Dhaka and made its
displeasure known. On her part, the Bangladesh Prime Minister,
Sheikh Hasina, would need to do some tight-rope walking -
recognising India's concern while avoiding the impression of
succumbing to New Delhi's pressure.
The India-Bangladesh relationship is a mix of complex factors -
which operate differently, depending on who is in power in Dhaka.
The Awami League Government had been keen on forging friendly
ties with India. At the same time, it had to guard against the
perception of a tilt towards New Delhi. The Opposition is
continuously looking to pounce on the Government at the slightest
sign of a perceived softness towards India. The main Opposition
party, the Bangladesh National Party of Begum Khaleda Zia, had
never tried to hide its antipathy towards New Delhi - and, in
this, it was supported by its allies. There were at least two
factors that made anti-India sentiment highly potent - it had the
support, on the one hand, of sections of the armed forces and, on
the other, of religious fundamentalists. The pro-Pakistan
elements, who had not reconciled themselves to the creation of an
independent Bangladesh (but did not dare say so publicly) took
shelter behind the India-baiting parties. It was a highly
polarised pattern.
Elections in Bangladesh are not far away and this makes the
current situation particularly sensitive. The Opposition is
certain to intensify its efforts to find new means to embarrass
the Government and what could be a more effective way than making
use of the India factor? In the present surcharged atmosphere,
this is the easiest of the political options.
The Hasina Government finds itself in an unenviable position - it
could not highlight, for instance, the benefits accruing from the
agreement with India on the sharing of the Ganga waters, with a
section of the Opposition either questioning the gain to
Bangladesh or twisting it to highlight its pro- India bias.
Sheikh Hasina, therefore, took a big risk in avoiding a
jingoistic posture and in helping contain the diplomatic fall-
out.
It is natural for suspicions to arise as regards the role of
various elements and for the sequence of developments to be
closely scrutinised. Could it not be the handiwork of elements
out to stir, on the one hand, anti-India sentiment and, on the
other, to put the Government on the mat? To talk of convergence
between the interests of these elements and pro-Pakistan section
is to stress the obvious. The infiltration of the ISI into
sensitive agencies of Bangladesh is known, but some firm evidence
is required to conclude that it was actively involved in the
recent incident.
There are in-built handicaps for India in its dealings with
neighbours, stemming from the asymmetry in size, population,
economic strength and resources. India also has land or maritime
borders with each one of them, while others do not have this
contiguity. It creates presumptions of a hegemonistic approach
among them while New Delhi is caught in fears of a gang-up.
In this setting, India becomes a major factor in the domestic
politics of the neighbours - not only in Bangladesh but also in
Nepal and Sri Lanka. The Hrithik Roshan episode in Nepal last
December proves the point. The baseless rumour of alleged
derogatory remarks by the film star was enough to trigger large-
scale mob frenzy, rioting and killings - and for the protests to
acquire shrill anti-India overtones. Only when the factual
situation was known and it was established that the offensive
remark ascribed to the actor was never made, was calm restored.
By then considerable damage had been done.
The political parties in Nepal have vied with one another in
generating and exploiting anti-India sentiment. Both the extreme
left and the monarchists have been equally active in such
campaigns. The issues cover a wide range - the 1950 treaty, rival
claims on the demarcation of the border in unclear cases,
especially on Kalapani, and the India-Nepal- China tri-junction.
India has its quota of grievances. As regards Sri Lanka, the
operation of the India factor has a long, unsavoury history, with
the IPKF period representing the bitter climax.
Pakistan had been making all-out efforts to fan the anti-India
sentiment in the neighbouring countries, finding the ground
particularly fertile in Nepal and Bangladesh. In Nepal, the
operations of Pakistan's ISI were both vast and deep. There were
clearly identified cases, where the Pakistani hand was
responsible for creating problems for New Delhi. At times, it
succeeded in damaging its relations with Nepal. The Hrithik
Roshan episode, for instance, could not have acquired the
dimensions it did but for the role of Pakistani elements. The
open India-Nepal border provides them an ideal situation to
smuggle operatives into India. The case of the alleged
involvement of a Pakistani diplomat in Kathmandu in the
engineering of violent activities was the latest in the unsavoury
series, of which the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane was
the most horrible. In Bangladesh, the ISI job is easier - it,
after all, was part of their country and there are strong
linkages at various levels.
What are the lessons for New Delhi? Increased vigilance, of
course, apart from improved intelligence network. More important,
there is a case for discarding the tendency to shelve solutions
of pending problems. It is shameful on the part of authorities to
cite the difficult terrain of the 6.5-k.m. undemarcated sector of
the border with Bangladesh to justify their criminal inaction.
Cases of ``adverse possession'' along the border are standing
provocations and, as such, delay in sorting them out is
inexplicable. Frequent contacts at the top level could help
dispel misperceptions and misunderstandings and prevent petty
wrangles from becoming unmanageable. If the Government heads in
Western Europe, to cite one example, could meet every other
month, what prevents the top leaders here from having frequent
contacts?
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