Persisting with the peace process

By Amitabh Mattoo

MORE THAN a hundred days after the unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir was initiated, there is growing cynicism at the lack of progress of the peace process. Even otherwise well-informed commentators on Kashmir have given up on the Government's new initiative. On the surface, there is indeed scope for disappointment. The level of violence in the State has not gone down in any significant manner. In fact, more policemen and civilians have been killed in the first hundred days of the ceasefire than were killed in the hundred days immediately preceding the Ramzan initiative. Only in terms of militant deaths, do official figures record a decline. The Kashmir Valley has witnessed vocal streets protests at alleged custodial deaths, and some influential observers have even described the mood as being reminiscent of the early 1990s when the militancy commanded popular appeal. The security forces, reports suggest, are increasingly becoming frustrated at being forced into passivity, and are angered at the free run given to militants. And there are still no signs of a formal dialogue between the Government and Kashmiri separatists. Is it time then to call off the new Kashmiri initiative?

Far from it. Any systematic and clinical evaluation of the last three months would recognise that not only have tangible gains been made, but also that it would be disastrous for New Delhi to abandon its initiatives at this critical stage. Moreover, as should be clear from the experience of other peace processes, the most visible dividends are rarely publicly flaunted and are not known until after the process has been brought to a successful closure.

At the very least, the Ramzan initiative has had considerable success in four areas. First, consider the international impact. Nearly every Government of consequence has supported the ceasefire, and explicitly demanded that militant groups controlled by Pakistan reciprocate the move, to help create an atmosphere conducive for a dialogue. It is easy in these heady days to forget that through much of 1990s, New Delhi waged a fierce diplomatic battle in international forums to prevent an internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, even as it was repeatedly castigated for human rights violations by its security forces. Nearly all of Indian diplomacy had degenerated into being a defence of New Delhi's Kashmir policy. Fortunately, the situation has now dramatically changed, at least in part because of New Delhi's recent initiatives. Not only are there few, if any, supporters of Pakistan's Kashmir policy, but there is also increasing international recognition that the army of Islamic jehadis could unleash terror even beyond South Asia. The U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, has, on the soil of Pakistan, declared U.N. resolutions on Kashmir irrelevant and unequivocally expressed his support for the bilateralism emphasised in the Lahore Declaration. No longer does the Government of India need to feel besieged internationally on Kashmir, but it must also recognise that a continued imaginative and sensitive handling of the province, domestically, could win it even greater support internationally.

No less important are the gains on the ground. Only contrarians can deny that the popular sentiment against violence is slowly but surely translating into a powerful constituency. Evidence of the momentum in this direction is not found in the predictable shrieks of the vocal minority, but in the attitudes of the subdued and often seldom heard majority. It is this bulk of Kashmiri public opinion that is showing signs of resistance and making a brave effort, away from the public eye, to recover Kashmir's traditional non-violent ethos. Indeed, if the most important purpose of the ceasefire was to provide a sense of relief to the Kashmiris, it has, to a great extent, succeeded. Despite aberrations, there have been few cordon and search operations, and most independent observers recognise that the ceasefire has brought about a perceptible change in the quality of life of the average Kashmiri.

Equally significant is the gradual isolation of the elements perpetuating violence. While the security forces have not been guilt free, it is clear to Kashmiris and the international community that most of the violence has been perpetuated by two non-Kashmiri militant organisations: the Lashkar-i-Taiba and the Jaish-i-Mohammad. Both organisations are led, manned, financed, trained and controlled by forces in Pakistan and have less than a tenuous link with elements that lie at the very heart of the Pakistani establishment.

Finally, New Delhi's new initiative has forced the separatist alliance, the All Party Hurriyat Conference, to introspect, clarify its understanding of the problems of Kashmir and isolate elements within it that are clearly following an imported agenda. Not only did most leaders of the Hurriyat welcome the ceasefire, but also wanted the unilateral ceasefire to be converted into a multilateral one that would silence all the guns in the State. This was the stated aim of the Hurriyat's proposed visit to Pakistan. Most important, however, was the manner in which the majority of the Hurriyat executive rebuked attempts by Mr. Ali Shah Gilani of the Jamat-i-Islami to give a religious colour to the political problems in the State. The most important attempt in this direction was the forthright interview given by the prominent Hurriyat leader, Mr. Abdul Ghani Lone, to the Srinagar- based Urdu Weekly Chattan in January, which unfortunately received little play in the national media.

These gains cannot, however, hide the obvious failures of the process and three are clearly visible. First, the local police, especially the Special Operations Group, have not abided by the letter and spirit of the ceasefire. One of the biggest sources of past estrangement of the Kashmiri people from the Government of India is the perceived duplicity in the latter's behaviour. The only way to prove this impression false is by demonstrating that there is no disjunction between Government posturing and the reality on the ground. A decision to announce a unilateral ceasefire would have anticipated that the level of violence would increase, pro-India elements would be targeted, and that militants may get the opportunity to regroup . But the political gains from the initiative were thought to be, as they obviously are, greater than these short-term tactical reverses, which can easily be overcome. It was particularly outrageous, therefore, for the State's police chief to declare, in a recent interview, that may be the Army cannot indulge in combat operations but the police will continue to work. If the local political leadership is backing the police, it is time that the Chief Minister is read the riot act. Personal ambitions cannot be allowed to hijack the Government's bravest initiative on Kashmir in recent years.

The Government of India has also given the impression that it does not have a clear road map for the process, and that hardliners within its own ranks are forcing it into a one step forward and two steps backward approach. The continued focus, and often contradictory statements, on the trivial issue of whether or not to give passports to members of the Hurriyat delegation, and the controversy over the differences between the Prime Minister's Office and the Home Ministry, are just two examples of the Government's failure to present a united cohesive front that is in full control of the process.

The failures of the Hurriyat cannot also be glossed over. Although the leadership has managed to resolve some of its internal contradictions, the Hurriyat still seems to be out of step with the public mood. The need of the hour is not the conspiratorial politics of the boardroom, but to demonstrate real chutzpah - a quality admittedly rare in Kashmiri politics. Only the ability to take calculated political risks will help the Hurriyat remain politically relevant and in tune with the reality that the popular sentiment in the Valley is overwhelmingly against violence and for a peaceful resolution of all problems through a dialogue. And a meaningful dialogue with New Delhi is the only way to move the peace process forward.

What next? The Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, has indicated that all parties concerned from Jammu and Kashmir will be invited for a dialogue. This is an important signal that must not, however, be allowed to be frittered away by including those nationalist groups which have no real relevance in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, a special Task Force, which is constituted by the highest political authority of the country and enjoys its confidence, and is dedicated full time to Jammu and Kashmir, must be appointed immediately. The Task Force should be made responsible for initiating and furthering a political dialogue and monitoring and assisting in governance and developmental activities.

(The writer is Director, National Security Programme, JNU, New Delhi.)

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