Back to nuclear bickering with U.S.?

By C. Raja Mohan

NEW DELHI, FEB. 18. Will India and the United States get back to the familiar nuclear bickering of the past? The choice is entirely up to the Bush Administration, informed sources here suggest. On its part, the Government appears to be holding its fire to give the benefit of the doubt to the new mandarins in Washington who are expected to take some more time to settle down and come to grips with the minutiae of various policy issues.

It would take very little for New Delhi to slam the remarks of the U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, a few days ago clubbing India with Iran and North Korea and categorising them as countries threatening the security of the U.S. and its allies. Nor is it difficult for New Delhi to challenge the interpretation of the U.S. State Department that the nuclear cooperation between India and Russia violates the international norms.

Those who live in glass houses should not be throwing stones. Accusing others of violating arms control agreements does not sit well with an administration which wants to scrap the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, and has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which the U.S. has sponsored with so much fanfare in the early 1990s.

Mr. Rumsfeld thinks the ABM treaty is a relic of the Cold War. He argues that the conditions that generated the treaty no longer exist, and hence wants to either revise or scrap the agreement. India too believes that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an anachronism. New Delhi argues the nuclear rules derived from the NPT are neither effective nor capable of addressing the complex realities on the ground.

Just as Washington wants to change the nuclear rules, which prevent it from moving forward on missile defences, New Delhi too thinks the current non-proliferation regime must be revised to accommodate India's interests. Both Russia and France believe the time has come to change some of the outmoded non- proliferation rules that end up targeting only India.

Passage of time and evolution of technology have in any case begun to make many of the past principles of arms control irrelevant. Instead of grandstanding in public, the Bush Administration must find a way to build on the nuclear dialogue that took place between the two countries after India's nuclear tests in May 1998. A new and more purposeful dialogue between the two might produce more common ground on arms control issues than many think possible at this moment.

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Mr. Rumsfeld's nuclear remarks have not come out of the blue. In the last few weeks there has been a sustained campaign against Russian nuclear exports. Late last month, in a leader article, The Economist from London accused Moscow of cheating on international nuclear agreements. The article titled, `Russia breaks its word', cited the Russian decision to supply enriched uranium fuel to the Tarapur Reactor and the agreement to sell nuclear reactors to India. A few days later, the Director of U.S. Central Intelligence, Mr. George Tenet, told the U.S. Congress that Russia is using trade in sensitive technologies to promote its relations with countries such as China, India and Iran. Mr. Rumsfeld has now followed with his own tirade.

India is clearly caught in the new crossfire between the U.S. and Russia on nuclear arms control issues. Russia is campaigning against the Bush Administration's plans to build missile defences. And the U.S. is accusing Russia of being an ``active proliferator''. The Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin, has, in fact, come up with comprehensive proposals to rework the current non-proliferation regime to facilitate greater international cooperation in peaceful uses of sensitive technologies while curbing more effectively the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

To avoid being a victim of this new tension between Washington and Moscow, New Delhi needs to articulate a comprehensive view on missile defences, nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation to stake out a position of its own in the incipient great debate on nuclear issues.

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Meanwhile, it is quite clear that one hand of the Bush Administration does not know what the other is doing. Here is the Secretary of State, Mr. Colin Powell, calling on the U.S. ``to deal more wisely'' with India and initiate a broader engagement with New Delhi. But the word has not clearly reached Mr. Rumsfeld who rather casually brings up India in a discussion of Russian nuclear policies.

In his first testimony to the Congress, Mr. Powell said, ``Soon to be the most populous country in the world, India has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavour''.

This is the first time ever that the U.S. has talked about a role for India in maintaining peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region. It will clearly be a long while before this objective is reconciled with the differences with New Delhi over non- proliferation and other issues.

Seasoned observers of U.S. politics say mixed signals are quite common in the early days of a new administration. It takes many months before the foreign policy team of a new President finds coherent set of ideas and a rhythm in their articulation and implementation. It may be sensible then to wait and watch than respond with full-blown rhetoric against every statement from Washington. But it is equally important for India to convey its displeasure through appropriate channels.

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There is no hiding the fact that the non-proliferation establishment in Washington remains a big obstacle to improved relations between India and the United States. The non- proliferation fundamentalists in the U.S. have been sore with President Bill Clinton for letting India ``get away lightly'' with its ``defiance'' of the international nuclear order in May 1998.

Instead of ``punishing'' New Delhi, they believe, Mr. Clinton was ``seduced'' by the charms of India. They argue that President Clinton had during his visit to India in March 2000 had ``over- compensated'' for Washington's past neglect of New Delhi.

How could they accept the fact that India's nuclear tests were followed by a highly successful visit of an American President to India, the first in 22 years and a quick return visit by the Indian Prime Minister with no real movement in resolving nuclear differences. New Delhi must expect that the non-proliferation lobby in Washington will create more problems for Indo-U.S. relations in the coming months, and devise a smart diplomatic strategy to overcome the challenge.

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