Restructuring defence & security

By V. Jayanth

BY THE end of September, the four special task forces set up by the Government to look at the recommendations of the Subrahmanyam Committee (that reviewed the security system in the wake of Kargil), submitted their reports to the Group of Ministers (GoM) which will take the final decisions. For three months now, the GoM has considered not just the voluminous main report, but also the distilled views of the expert committees. These task forces looked at the intelligence apparatus, internal security, border management and defence management. Though the winter session of Parliament was supposed to discuss the Subrahmanyam Committee's report, it failed to.

It is about time the GoM made up its mind what final shape it should give to the various recommendations for a comprehensive revamp of the defence establishment and coordination among various security as well as intelligence agencies around the country. Integrating the intelligence services and ensuring a greater level of interaction among the various agencies - the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Military Intelligence to name the top ones - should take precedence over other issues. With continuing violence in Kashmir and the Northeast, which also involve borders with neighbouring countries, speed is of the essence. Having created a National Security Council (NSC), an Advisory Board and appointed a National Security Adviser (NSA), the GoM must make sure there is no duplication or overlap of responsibilities. Too many cooks spoil the broth. The focus must be on vertical as well as lateral coordination so that every piece of intelligence is considered seriously and acted upon. One arm of the Government must not work against the other, or in competition, and this is particularly true for the IB and the RAW. They must supplement and complement each other and also encourage the intelligence wings of the State Government to share information. An apex council, comprising all these agencies, must be able to sift through all intelligence reports regularly and enable the NSA to provide detailed input to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Committee on Security.

On the question of internal security, a number of problem States and areas have already been identified. Some States are hit by insurgency, a few others face problems from naxalites and left extremists, while a handful of States have to deal with communal tensions. These issues need to be addressed and reviewed constantly as part of the exercise to improve internal security. (In the Rajiv Gandhi administration, there was a Minister of State in the Home Ministry exclusively dealing with internal security.) There is need for close and constant interaction with the troubled States, overall management of paramilitary forces along with the Rapid Action Force, and helping the States enhance their intelligence and security systems. The IB and the RAW must share whatever intelligence they have with the affected States, particularly when they are on the borders, so that the focus can shift to prevention.

The task force on border management has come up with its own recommendations, based on the Subrahmanyam report. This deals with the north and the west on one side, and the eastern flanks on the other. The porous borders on both sides posed serious challenges and the whole Kargil intrusion was a fallout of the traditional practices in winter along the Line of Control (LoC), as against the procedures adopted along the boundaries. The Government is raising a fence along the border with Bangladesh, but it will take a few years to complete. Many of the militant groups in the Northeast are reported to be moving in and out of the neighbouring countries - even functioning out of them. All these have to be reckoned with in evolving an effective mechanism to monitor the borders and step up security. The spillover effect is also something that causes a lot of concern. The other aspect of border management relates to maritime borders. The Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea have all to be watched and constantly monitored. Apart from the territorial or security related tensions, the whole question of administering the Exclusive Economic Zone has to be considered.

The final aspect of the review revolves around the restructuring of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Independent of the Arun Singh task force, the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes, has promised a revamp of the MoD to bring about a healthier interaction among the service chiefs and the bureaucrats. This will involve a revamp of the entire defence establishment to increase the level of coordination among the three services and the MoD, and also providing the service chiefs greater say in decision-making. The Arun Singh committee has made some far- reaching suggestions in this regard and the GoM must decide quickly how to effect the changes.

A major recommendation from the Arun Singh task force is the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). An earlier debate in the MoD centered over what would suit the Indian context - the CDS or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both have their advantages and problems, but a final decision should depend on which system can operate better in the Indian scenario. The task force has preferred the DCS option, under which the seniormost officer from the services becomes the CDS and represents all the three wings. There will be a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff to liaise with the commanders. The purpose of this institution is to integrate the functioning of all services and remove the element of insularity in their operations. The CDS will be in a position to optimise the available resources and prioritise the requirements.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the alternative and an American model. Here, the seniormost among the three service chiefs becomes the Chairman and the post rotates among the chiefs, as and when they retire. After considering this option, the Arun Singh task force has suggested the CDS as that would become a full-fledged institution by itself. When a CDS does into effect, the rank of Defence Secretary, who is a bureaucrat, will also have to be promoted to that of a Principal Secretary, so that they remain on equal terms. Whatever the new system, the equation of the defence chief with the NSC must also be worked out. The important thing is to avoid duplication of effort.

But the more sensitive issue that the GoM and the Defence Minister in particular must sort out is integration between the uniformed services and the bureaucrats. Senior defence officials will have to be posted in the MoD, and some IAS officers should also be taken into each of the services so that there is greater interaction, a give and take. There is bound to be resistance from both sides, but the exercise must start from somewhere. At least at the level of Joint Secretaries, some IAS officials will have to be inducted into the three services in the administrative headquarters, while second or third level officers from the Army, the Air Force and the Navy must also be taken into the MoD, so that they could bring their expertise to play on matters relating to their force.

The Kargil affair has provided an invaluable opportunity for the Government to take a close look at the entire defence and security scenario in the country and make some long overdue as well as sweeping changes to the systems. Without concentrating powers in any individual or agency, the GoM must decentralise powers and bring about a friendly interaction and coordination among all the Government agencies involved in these sensitive duties. The decisions must be left to the Government, but the Cabinet must have the best and right inputs to take the right decisions in the national interest.

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