Indian armed forces and Sri Lanka

By Atul Aneja

NEW DELHI, JUNE 2. Hoping to erase the bitter memories of their previous engagement in Sri Lanka, the armed forces in recent weeks have been seeking government sanction for greater activism in case the LTTE took over Jaffna town.

According to highly placed sources in the government, the three services held long brainstorming sessions to consider possible ``forced'' evacuation of soldiers trapped in the Jaffna peninsula, in case it fell to the Tigers.

The dominant view in the services after these consultations was that evacuation could be enforced along three possible lines, in case the LTTE decided against facilitating a peaceful pull-out. All plans by the services revolved around the Palaly airbase and the port of Kankesanthurai.

According to one view, the navy, on its own could play a central role in evacuation by ``securing'' the port of Kankesanthurai. Pull-out could follow after Sri Lankan soldiers made it to the port on their own. The navy had the capability to ferry out these troops in its Landing Ship Tanks (LST). The requisitioning of merchant shipping to de-induct the large numbers involved was also contemplated. The navy's Kashin class destroyers and the Kukhri class corvettes were to provide fire cover for this mission, if required.

The second option revolved around securing Kankesanthurai and Palaly simultaneously. In that case the operations were to be of a tri-service nature, involving the heliborne induction of an army battalion in Palaly. The IAF could carry out the evacuation in Palaly inside the sanitised zone.

Troop pull-out, it was envisaged, could also be carried out only through the Palaly air base by the Indian Air Force (IAF) alone.

Enforced evacuation, it was assumed, was likely to involve limited military engagement with the LTTE. The armed forces, currently riding a post-Kargil high, have been more than willing to face such an eventuality.

The government's view, which ultimately prevailed, opposed forced evacuation. This was evident in statements by the National Security Adviser, who after one of the several meetings of the Cabinet Committee of Security on Sri Lanka, said that evacuation could take place only after ``proper conditions'' had been created. The External Affairs Minister, who was then in Teheran, also said that Indian forces would not get into a fire- fight with the Tigers. Sources in the foreign office have pointed out that evacuation is a messy affair and that by a foreign power - in this case India - is messier still.

Grappling with the complexity of the Sri Lankan situation, a section of the security establishment outside the armed forces is of the view that any Indian initiative in Sri Lanka must have the LTTE on board. Not surprisingly, a message has been sent to the Tigers ``loud and clear'' that creation of a Tamil Eelam is out of the question, but genuine autonomy which met Tamil aspirations could always be considered.

Given the LTTE's rigid hierarchy, reaching out to the LTTE supremo V.Prabhakaran is becoming inevitable. The message which may have to be delivered to Prabhakaran is that he has a chance to emerge a ``statesman'' if he accepts the demand for ``seamless autonomy'' within the ambit of a united Sri Lanka.

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