Sri Lanka's call for help

By V. R. Raghavan

AFTER THE IPKF reached Jaffna in 1987, the Government of India conducted a series of meetings with the LTTE high command. In the breaks for coffee there was always the opportunity to talk informally with the Tigers' Chief, Mr. Prabhakaran. During one such chat, he told me that Jaffna is the symbol of Tamil nationalism. He asserted that the Tigers can never give up on the city. The LTTE has shown repeatedly that it is willing to bear high costs to retain, or regain, the city of Jaffna.

The fall of Elephant Pass and the rapid advance of the LTTE towards Jaffna is a defining moment in the history of the ongoing conflict. A large Sri Lankan Army (SLA) force has been pulled out from and around the Elephant Pass. It could have in the normal course offered enough resistance to the LTTE in the Jaffna peninsula. Unfortunately that seems no longer feasible, due to Sri Lanka's reduced ability to conduct the campaign. The Sri Lankan navy does not control most of the coastline relevant to the campaign. The air force does not dominate the skies in the area. The navy and air force are no longer in a position to sustain the SLA with uninterrupted supplies. Successive and costly defeats in set-piece battles has also sapped the morale of the military. There are large scale desertions from the SLA.

It would, therefore, appear that the fall of Jaffna cannot be delayed for long. There is a clamour in Sri Lanka for obtaining outside military support. India figures high in the calculations, as the probable source of such support. The Buddhist clergy has called on the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo to make such a request. The former Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mr. Ranil Wickramsinghe, was in India recently, to size up the response in the event of the fall of Jaffna. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Lakhsman Kadirgamar, has also met Mr. Vajpayee, apparently with a message from the Sri Lankan President, Ms. Chandrika Kumaratunga.

The loss of Jaffna would be a very serious setback to the Government in Sri Lanka. It would need a major military operation to recapture the territory. It is no longer in a position to conduct such a campaign. A complete control of the LTTE over the peninsula will inevitably give rise to an influx of refugees into Tamil Nadu. The LTTE will exploit the refugee influx to recreate its presence in the State. A politically explosive situation is therefore a likely possibility. The Government in Tamil Nadu cannot but respond to the public mood about the refugee situation. The ruling party in Tamil Nadu is a partner in the governing alliance in New Delhi. There is the likelihood of strains in the alliance partnership.

The Sri Lanka Government having asked for Indian help, the choices are not any easier for New Delhi. As of now, the talk is of seeking Indian help in evacuating the army elements locked in the peninsula. This would involve Indian military aircraft landing and taking off from the airfields near Jaffna. The Sri Lankan air force and army are in no position to ensure the

safety of Indian aircraft which would, therefore, be vulnerable to LTTE attacks. This will be from anti-aircraft missiles or mortar and artillery fire on the airfields. If security is to be ensured for the aircraft on ground and in air, an Indian military presence in and around Jaffna would be essential. This will involve Indian troops in direct conflict with the LTTE. This will also be true of any naval support India may be asked to provide. There has been some reference to Indian military support in the form of artillery and landing ships being made available. The possibility of air attacks against the LTTE by Indian combat aircraft is also being talked about.

It is necessary to identify the fundamental Indian interest which is going to be met by direct military assistance to the Government in Colombo. What India needs most is a peaceful resolution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. A military solution is no longer possible. Sri Lankan experts have also come around to that conclusion. In fact, the misplaced belief in a faction within the SLA that a military solution can be imposed on the LTTE, has led to the present situation. Under the circumstances, the Indian role must be to bring the conflict to an end by means other than military. Allowing the conflict to continue by aiding the SLA, which has failed to subdue the LTTE, will only extend the fruitless military conflict indefinitely.

There is a possibility that in the event of India not responding to its plea for assistance, the Sri Lankan Government may seek it from elsewhere. The Government in Colombo has announced that it has sought such assistance from a number of countries. Such assistance can come from a state or states within South Asia, or, from outside the region. The Government of India will have to decide whether such a development will be in India's interests. This is particularly relevant in the context of Sri Lanka's changed perspectives on India. Ms. Chandrika Kumaratunga had earlier stated that ``The India factor is crucial to our (Sri Lankan) nation. It is a natural and vital ingredient of our national well-being.'' The choices before the Government of India are therefore complex and sensitive.

India cannot remain uninvolved with Sri Lanka. That involvement should, however, be of facilitating a peaceful outcome through constructively engaging both sides to the conflict. The sensible option would be to work towards the cessation of hostilities in the Jaffna peninsula. A ceasefire jointly agreed between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, to be followed by serious negotiations, appears the best possible way ahead. A ceasefire would allow the airlift of SLA personnel from the Jaffna peninsula. This can be assisted by Indian civilian or military aircraft. It would also imply that the Government in Colombo would be willing to substantially reduce its military presence in the peninsula. The LTTE will quite predictably object to a ceasefire on the ground that it will allow the SLA to regroup and recoup.

The situation is, however, not entirely without some positive possibilities. If Jaffna falls, the situation could also stabilise. There are fears expressed that if the SLA manages to hold out in the peninsula, the LTTE would turn its attention towards Trincomalee. However, the LTTE's ability to mount towards Trincomalee, the scale of operations it did at Elephant Pass and in the run on Jaffna, is suspect. It is therefore possible that in the event of Jaffna falling to the LTTE, there would be a stalemate. The LTTE would hold the peninsula and the SLA would concentrate on denying to the LTTE the Eastern province. The LTTE's gains would would be confined to Jaffna, while the SLA would have stabilised on the Eastern province. That might be a sobering state of affairs in which both sides could start a serious dialogue.

The immediate need is for preventing a major political disaster in the peninsula of a very large SLA force becoming captive. Such an outcome is going to make nearly impossible any future dialogue between the two sides. It will make it difficult for the Kumaratunga Government to enter into a dialogue with the LTTE. Public opinion and political costs would effectively prevent it. The LTTE would on its part become ever more strident in its demands on the basis of its `victory'.

India as the major regional player has a responsibility towards the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. It can best fulfil that role by choosing carefully between allowing the conflict to continue, and facilitating an early dialogue between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government. An Indian military involvement in Sri Lanka would turn out to be an unpredictable one, both in the time dimension and in its consequences. An Indian military involvement in the ethnic conflict of the island nation would not be in anyone's interest.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Opinion
Previous : Restore cricket's credibility
Next     : India & nuclear disarmament