Taliban is the biggest gainer

By K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, DEC. 31. The biggest gainer of the eight-day hijacking episode, that ended tonight, is the Taliban. This point stands out in any assessment of how the various parties, either involved directly or connected indirectly, emerged out of it. The advantage of Taliban contrasts sharply with the credit-and-debit entries in India's account, on the one hand, and the none-too- happy projection of Pakistan, on the other. In New Delhi, there was a tremendous sense of relief over the release of 159 passengers and crew members of the unlucky plane but, at the same time, there was the painful realisation that a political climb- down became inevitable to achieve the objective of undoubted considerable humanitarian significance. Pakistan does not conceal its glee over New Delhi's discomfiture but its propaganda machinery was engaged all these days in virulent attacks against India, obviously to counter the widespread perception of their involvement in this terrorist act and to deflect attention from it.

The Taliban conducted itself with great sophistication from the time the hijacked plane landed at Kandahar, and have good reason to be happy with the end result. Each one of its moves, gestures and stances was calculated to project the best possible image. It began with the choice of Kandahar as the destination of the plane in Afghanistan. Initially, the hijackers planned to land at Kabul but that would not have yielded the desired dividends to the Taliban - for this city conjured up visions of obscurantism and bigotry as against Kandahar with its relaxed, moderate setting, which is more acceptable to the outside world. The Taliban Foreign Minister, Mr. Wakil Ahmed, along with other colleagues and functionaries, seemed to have followed a carefully-calibrated strategy with four distinct elements.

One, special care was taken not to say or do anything that could be construed even remotely as signifying sympathy with or support to the hijackers. On the contrary, it sought to detach itself from their actions. Two, the Taliban extended full cooperation to the Indian Government and provided logistical help, in particular facilitating contacts between the negotiating team from New Delhi and the hijackers. Three, it ensured against any harm to the hostages during the period the plane was on Afghan soil (poor Rippan Katyal had been done to death at an earlier stage - and his body was taken out of the plane at Dubai). Four, it did not involve itself in the negotiations between the Indian officials and hijackers but, nonetheless, influenced the course of what from all accounts was a bumpy interaction.

Think of the images Taliban projected eight days ago and now. In the first case, its lot was unenviable, howsoever viewed. Because of its conduct during the fighting for the control of Kabul and the rest of the country and afterwards, it came out as a medieval force, disdainful of modern ideas of tolerance, equity, of gender equality, putting the narrowest, even uncalled for interpretations on the tenets of Islam. The Taliban authorities were recognised by only three countries - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE - while the rest of the world regarded the Rabbani Government as the lawful authority even though it controlled some 10 per cent of the territory. India was amongst those countries which chose not to deal with it and, because of the suspicion of its involvement in the Kashmir violence, used to single it out, while drawing world attention to the urgency of combating transnational terrorism. Recently, the Taliban authorities were subjected to U.N. sanctions, in the wake of the U.S. embargo. For all practical purposes, they were international outlaws.

All that is changed now. Despite non-recognition, New Delhi has been dealing with the Taliban representatives this week. Diplomats belonging to the countries, the nationals of which were among the hostages, went to Kandahar, the media teams from all over the world descended on the city, primarily for covering the hijack episode but, in the process, focussing on the Taliban leaders and their activities, as they put their best foot forward. This widespread publicity - mostly positive - is certain to have a political and diplomatic spin-off, helping the Taliban to acquire legitimacy, even respectability, and, thus, enabling it to integrate with the global mainstream. The electronic media teams do not seem to have got even a single soundbite, projecting it as a bigoted force.

And yet the Taliban has not exposed itself to the charge - by Pakistan, the ISI or others in that category - that it let down the cause represented by the hijackers. This was evident from its conduct after the hijackers made known the first list of demands. The Taliban prevailed upon them to give up two ``un-Islamic'' items, namely, cash transfer of $ 200 million and the handing over of the body of a dead terrorist. The Taliban might have played a role in persuading the hijackers to scale down the third demand - for the release of 36 persons - but, obviously, did not seem to have opposed the idea of a ``gesture'' by India. By implication, the Taliban did not regard the use of hijacking as an instrument to serve whatever cause the hijackers sought to pursue. But that has not attracted attention, and it has got away with this negative implication.

The Taliban has succeeded in acquiring a diplomatic space which would be of considerable use to it. On its part, India will find it hard not to rethink its stand. Going by the experience of the last three or four days, there is the danger of analysts, both official and non-official, resorting to the facile assumption that the Taliban would be making a debut as a force, independent of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, its move to forge new ties will be an extension of the process, that did not go beyond its recognition by just three countries, including its creator, Pakistan.

To say this is not to suggest that Kabul, for all time to come, will accept the status of subservience to an outside power. That is the message conveyed by the conduct of this independence- loving nation. This, however, is not the immediate prospect.

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